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Gender voting gap in the dawn of urbanization: evidence 
from a quasi-experiment with Greek special elections 
 
Georgios Efthyvoulou*, Pantelis Kammas†  
and Vassilis Sarandides# 
 
ABSTRACT  
The electoral law of 31 May 1952 extended the voting rights to all adult women in 
Greece. This paper examines the impact of women’s enfranchisement on party vote 
shares by employing a unique dataset of 385 communities located in seven 
prefectures in Greece where by-elections took place in 1953 and 1954 (for strictly 
exogenous reasons). To estimate causal effects, we exploit the observed 
heterogeneity in the proportion of women in the electorate across communities as 
the identifying source of variation, and employ a difference-in-differences design 
that holds unobserved local characteristics fixed. Our results provide strong 
evidence in favour of the “traditional gender voting gap” (women voting more 
conservatively compared to men) in the urban prefecture of Thessaloniki, and no 
evidence of gender voting differences in the remaining (six) predominantly rural 
prefectures of our sample. Our results also reveal that the existence of a gender 
voting gap is highly conditional upon the proportion of economically inactive 
women; that is, women tend to vote for right parties when they are outside of the 
labour force. Interestingly, when we account for this conditionality, a suffrage-
induced pro-right shift can also be observed in communities outside Thessaloniki. 
Building on the economic bargaining models of the family, we argue that, in an 
economic environment characterized by limited demand for female labour force 
participation, women support more vigorously the sanctity and the strength of 
family values and tend to vote more conservatively compared to men. 
JEL classification: D72 
Keywords: women’s suffrage; political preferences; women’s labour market 
participation 
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1 
1. Introduction 
The relationship between democratic political institutions and the economy has been 
central to the political science and political economy literature (see, e.g., North, 1981, 1990; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). However, the role of women either as political actors that 
shaped the process of democratization or as electorate that voted in favour of specific fiscal 
policies – after women’s enfranchisement – has received little attention by the relevant 
literature.3 This is because, according to a number of scholars, the interests of family 
members are fully aligned (the so-called “family vote hypothesis”) and therefore extending 
voting rights to women would not have major consequences on implemented policies (see, 
e.g., McConnaughty, 2013; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000).4 Based on this rationale, the 
political conflict takes place along dimensions other than gender (such as, income or 
ethnic/religion differences), whereas the so-called “gender identity” is even totally absent, 
or not that important, compared to the common ethnic or income interests in voting 
behaviour. Hence, this strand of the literature most usually suggests that families with 
incomes below the mean would favour more redistributive policies, in line with the standard 
Meltzer and Richard (1981) argument.5 
However, starting from Tingsten (1937) and Duverger (1955) – the earliest systematic 
surveys of voting behaviour – a large number of empirical studies provide evidence of a 
substantial gender divergence in voting choices.6 In particular, most of the empirical studies 
that focus on US presidential elections, suggest that women were more keen to vote for the 
Republican Party in the 1950s and 1960s (see, e.g., Campbell et al., 1960; Corder and 
Wolbrecht, 2016). Similarly, in most European countries, the female electorate supported 
Christian Democratic parties during the first half of the 20th century (see, e.g., Duverger, 
1955; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Baxter and Lansing, 1983; Randall, 1987). This stylized fact is 
often described in the relevant literature as the “traditional gender voting gap” and it is 
mostly attributed to the increased religiosity of the female population and to differences in 
its social position, particularly with respect to participation into the paid labour force (see, 
Baxter and Lansing, 1983; Mayer and Smith, 1985).  
Interestingly, this trend in gender voting gap seems to have altered during the early 1980s. 
Specifically, from that period on, the female electorate voted more intensively in favour of 
the Democratic Party in the US presidential elections (see, e.g., Caroll, 1988; Chaney et al., 
 
3 To be more precise, there is a small but growing empirical literature showing that women’s enfranchisement 
affected positively total government spending (see, e.g,. Abrams and Settle, 1999; Lott and Kenny, 1999; Aidt 
and Dallal, 2008; Bertocchi, 2011; Kose et al., 2018), while, at the same time, government budget allocation 
altered in favour of specific spending accounts, such as spending on health (see e.g. Miller, 2008) and public 
education (see e.g. Carruther and Wannamaker, 2015). However, the specific social and economic 
circumstances under which women won political rights, as well as the influence of women’s enfranchisement on 
the electoral fortunes of political parties, has been much less investigated (see, e.g., Corder and Woldbrecht, 
2016; Morgan-Collins and Teele, 2018; Teele, 2018b). 
4 A number of empirical studies employing household survey data provide evidence in favour of the family vote 
hypothesis (see, e.g., Lombard, 1997; Zuckerman et al., 1998; Jennings and Stoker, 2005; Zuckerman et al., 
2005; Coffe and Need, 2010). Moreover, most of these studies agree that, prior to the 1970s, spousal 
agreement in party identification was stronger, with men exerting a greater political influence within the family 
compared to women.   
5 For a more detailed description of how the so-called “family vote” hypothesis leads to no gender gap in 
political preferences and concludes to the revival of the standard Meltzer and Richard (1981) argument, see 
Morgan-Collins and Teele (2018) and Teele (2018a). 
6 More precisely, Duverger (1955) suggests that spouses usually vote in the same way - i.e., family vote 
hypothesis - but when differences in voting choices exist, women tend to vote more conservatively than men.  
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1998; Manza and Brooks, 1998; Trevor, 1999) and in favour of left-wing parties in most 
European countries (see, e.g., Togeby, 1994; Inglehart and Norris, 2000; 2003; Giger, 2009). 
A number of scholars attribute this “modern gender voting gap” to the increased demand 
for female labour force that came as a result of the enormous expansion of the clerical 
sector during that period (see, Inglehart and Norris, 2000; 2003; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 
2010 for more details on this). The rationale is that women voted for left-wing parties since 
they are in favour of specific welfare policies (such as, child care and elderly care) that 
relieve them from family burdens and allow them to invest in marketable skills that increase 
their economic independence (see, Iversen et al., 2005; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006).7 
The paper at hand discusses the social and political circumstances under which the women 
enfranchisement took place in Greece in 1952, and investigates empirically the potential 
existence of a gender voting gap in Greece during that period.8 A number of historical 
characteristics make the case of Greece unique both from a theoretical and an empirical 
point of view. First, the timing of the reform in Greece allows us to investigate the existence 
and the direction of a “gender gap in political preferences” in the dawn of urbanization. This 
is because, during the early 1950s, Greece was basically an agrarian economy with half of its 
population living in rural and semi-urban areas. Only in the decades of 1950s and 1960s, a 
large share of population moved from the countryside to the cities and a wide group of 
urban population was formed (see, e.g., Kanellopoulos, 1995). To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study that investigates gender political differences during that 
phase of economic development (i.e., as an economy moves away from the agricultural 
phase) since previous studies that investigate early gender voting gaps mostly focus on 
economies that are basically industrialized during the period of women’s enfranchisement 
(see, e.g., Morgan-Collins, 2019; Morgan-Collins and Teele, 2018).9 An interesting 
 
7 An alternative explanation is provided by Manza and Brooks (1998) who suggest that entering in the labour 
market exposes women to gender inequalities that they are less likely to experience as homemakers and this 
may lead them to support left-wing parties. Similarly, Sears and Citrin (1982) argue that women are more likely 
than men to be economically vulnerable and this may explain their increased support to redistributive policies 
and pro-welfare policies parties’ agendas. 
8 Previous studies focusing on Greece include Macridis (1981) who provides descriptive evidence in favour of a 
traditional gender voting gap in the elections of 1974 and 1977, and Tsokou et al., (1986) who employ data from 
the 1980 Euro-Barometer survey suggesting that women supported disproportionately the right-wing New 
Democracy party. More recently, Pantelidou Maloutas (1992), based on the 1988 survey data from the National 
Centre for Social Research, provides evidence in favor of a traditional gender voting gap when the analysis 
focuses on participants above the age of 30, but traces the existence of a modern gender voting gap for the age 
cohort of 18-29 years old. Similarly, Limberes (1986) based on a public opinion survey that was conducted at the 
time of the 1981 general election, concludes that the traditional conservatism of Greek women seems to 
dissolve very rapidly from the early 1980s. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first that employs 
advanced econometric tools and electoral data before and after the reform of women enfranchisement in 
Greece in order to investigate the aforementioned issues. 
9 Greece is a distinctive case – compared to the countries analysed in previous studies (e.g., US, UK, Sweden, 
Norway, Canada) –  also concerning the dimension of culture. More precisely, Greece is a country characterized 
by strong family ties and in general a rather collectivistic culture (see, e.g., Hofstede, 2001). This appears to be a 
characteristic of major importance since the existence of strong family ties operate as a substitute of formal 
welfare state institutions (see, e.g., Kammas et al., 2018) and thus is expected to affect both the structure and 
the functioning of the welfare state (see, e.g., Espring and Andersen, 1999). The reason is that, in the absence of 
formal risk sharing institutions (i.e. before the formation of welfare state), societies facing increased risks, such 
as climate variability or a higher prevalence of lethal diseases, developed informal insurance contracts 
(i.e. extended networks of “in group” relationships) to tackle the issue of uncertainty (see, e.g., Murray and 
Schaller, 2010 for more details no this). These cultural traits tend to persist – as heuristics or rules of thumb in 
decision making (see, e.g., Boyd and Richerson (1985) –  also in later phases of economic development and even 
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characteristic of that phase –  which is observable in the case of Greece during the 1950s –  
is that female labour force participation is not affected positively by economic development 
(see, e.g., Durand, 1975; Schultz, 1991; Goldin, 1995), while it remains higher in rural areas 
compared to the more urbanized ones. This phenomenon –  which appears to be of great 
importance for the purposes of our study –  can be explained on the basis of the theoretical 
arguments developed by Boserup (1970) and Goldin (1995). Specifically, in the early phase 
of industrialization, the rates of female labour force participation fell in most countries due 
to a social stigma attached to women working in manual jobs outside the family (see, e.g., 
Goldin 1990; 1995 for more details on this).10 
A second interesting characteristic in the case of Greece is that women enfranchisement 
came as a result of pressures from the United Nations, and it was never supported 
rigorously by any of the major domestic political parties (see, e.g., Samiou, 2013). This is 
because the late 1940s was an era of extremely high political uncertainty in Greece. The civil 
war (1946-1949) had just finished and the traditional centre-liberal and right-wing parties 
were postponing the extension of voting rights to women – that would double the size of 
the electorate –  since they were afraid that such a radical reform might have significant 
unintended consequences concerning the vote share of the left-wing parties (see, e.g., 
Samiou, 2013). However, on 20 December 1951, Greece became member state of the 
Security Council of the United Nations. This political development altered the policy 
followed by the Greek governments that was under the obligation to take specific steps that 
would ensure equality of political rights between men and women.11 The fact that suffrage 
was extended as a result of exogenous international pressures, and it was not outcome of 
domestic claims from specific parties and political movements, mitigates concerns of 
reverse causality in voting behaviour.12 In Appendix 1, we provide a detailed description of 
the procedures that were followed until the Bill of “full voting rights to all adult females” 
was enacted as a Law on 31 May 1952. 
Third, although the electoral law extended the voting rights to all adult women in Greece, 
the Ministry of Interior failed to update the electoral registers on time and therefore 
women could not participate in the parliamentary elections that took place some months 
later (16 November 1952). As a result, women went to the polls for the first time in seven 
specific electoral prefectures where by-elections took place in 1953 and 1954, aiming to fill 
seats that became vacant due to the death of an elected deputy or the cancellation of the 
 
after the development of formal welfare state institutions. Hence, a culture of strong family ties is expected to 
affect the whole functioning of the welfare state and consequently the voting behaviour of women.  
10 Building on the ideas of Boserup (1970), Goldin (1995) documents a U-shaped relationship between economic 
development and female labour force participation. Similarly, Mammen and Paxson (2000) provide evidence of 
a U-shaped relationship in a comparison of households of varying income within India and Thailand. For an 
excellent review of the relevant literature on female labour force participation, see Giuliano (2014).  
11 The international pressures towards the Greek government started in 1949, especially after the United 
Nations’ meeting that took place in Beirut on March 1949. In that meeting, it was decided that all members 
states were obliged to extend voting franchise to women within the next twelve months (see, e.g., Samiou, 
2013). 
12 Teele (2018a; 2018b) highlights the potential of strategic enfranchisement by elected leaders. More precisely, 
in an electoral landscape of high political competition, the legislators and parties that think they can mobilize 
women will be more supportive of women’s enfranchisement since they believe that they will be benefited by 
this reform. Obviously, the existence of this reverse causality channel generates serious endogeneity concerns 
and makes extremely hard to establish empirically a convincing causal relationship between women’s suffrage 
and party vote shares. 
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1952 election result by the electoral court.13 The timing of these by-elections is obviously 
exogenous to economic conditions and parties’ electoral influence, since an unexpected 
death is apparently a natural phenomenon (see Baskaran et al., 2015). Similarly, the timing 
of by-elections that came as a result of cancellations from the electoral court cannot be 
predicted. This set-up alleviates concerns regarding potential endogenous effects arising 
from knowing or being able to influence the timing of elections.  
Our analysis seeks to identify the causal relationship between women’s enfranchisement 
and party vote shares by employing a unique community-level dataset for seven Greek 
electoral prefectures that by-elections took place between 1953 and 1954. To this end, we 
employ a difference-in-differences (DD) method, where we exploit the uneven and 
exogenous spatial variation in the concentration of eligible (registered) women voters as a 
measure of the received “dosage” of the franchise reform in different communities (see, 
e.g., Cascio and Washington, 2013; Carruthers and Wanamaker, 2015; Vernby, 2013; 
Morgan-Collins, 2019). The basic idea is that, if women were biased in favour of a certain 
political party, the uneven “dosage” of women’s enfranchisement will cause a different 
change in the electoral influence of that political party after the reform. An additional 
advantage of this approach is that it allows us to take into account unobserved fixed 
community characteristics that could confound the true relationship between suffrage and 
electoral outcomes (see, e.g., Vernby, 2013).  
Our empirical findings provide evidence in favour of a traditional gender voting gap in the 
urban electoral prefecture of Thessaloniki – the second most urbanized prefecture of 
Greece after the capital city of Athens – where women were keener to vote in favor of the 
right-wing parties in comparison to men. In contrast, we find no effect in the panel of (the 
remaining) six predominantly rural electoral prefectures of Drama, Epidavros-Limira, Evros, 
Grevena, Phthiotis and Rethymno. When we pool together all electoral prefectures, our 
empirical analysis suggests a traditional gender voting gap in favor of right-wing parties 
driven by differences in the level of economically inactive women (i.e., decreased female 
labor force participation). Interestingly, when we calculate this conditional effect separately 
for Thessaloniki and the panel of the “Rest Prefectures”, this result continues to hold. In 
other words, we provide evidence of a traditional gender voting gap even in rural areas at 
high levels of female economic inactiveness. 
These findings can be interpreted as follows. In agricultural communities women work with 
the rest household members either on family farms or in home workshop production (see 
Goldin, 1995). Since women are part of the family business, their interests are fully aligned 
to those of the other family members and there is no gender gap in voting behaviour. 
Hence, in agricultural communities, our findings are consistent to the so-called family vote 
hypothesis. However, as economic development increases the productivity outside family 
enterprises, the locus of the production shifts from the family business to the factory or to 
other places of paid labour. Therefore, in more urbanized areas, male family members work 
outside the family farm at a higher wage and women stay at home and allocate most of 
their time to household activities, such as child bearing and rearing (see, e.g., Durand, 1975; 
Schultz, 1991; Goldin, 1995). Decreased female labor force participation in urban areas 
comes as a result of a widespread and strong social stigma against females working in 
 
13 It is worth noting that the electoral law [2228/1952] at the time of the 1952 election was purely majoritarian 
with 99 small prefecture-wide electoral constituencies. This law had provision for filling vacant seats in electoral 
constituencies between national elections through a by-election (see Nikolakopoulos, 2001 for more details on 
this). 
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manual jobs outside the family (see Goldin, 1995 for more details on this).14 This drop in 
women labour force participation (or increase in inactivity) in more urbanised areas, or 
specific rural areas, affects the voting behaviour of the female electorate by giving rise to 
the traditional gender voting gap. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
considerations upon which we base our analysis. Section 3 presents the empirical 
specification and the data. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 
summarizes the main points of the analysis. 
 
2. Theoretical considerations 
2.1 Gender gap in political preferences and the effect of female labour force 
participation 
The starting point for any theory of gender preferences over public policy is the question of 
whether the family can be treated as a unitary actor or as separate individuals. If we assume 
that the interests of the family members are fully aligned (see, e.g., Samuelson, 1956 and 
Becker, 1974; 1981), then there is no place for a gender gap in political preferences and 
consequently the political conflict takes place along dimensions other than gender. The 
most usual dimensions of political conflict are differences on income (see, e.g., Romer, 
1975; Roberts, 1977; Meltzer and Richard, 1981) or ethnic/religion identities (see, e.g., 
Alesina et al., 2001; Desmet et al., 2009), whereas the so-called “gender identity” appears to 
be a factor of minor importance –  compared to the common ethnic or income interests –  
for voting behaviour. By treating family as a unitary unit, this strand of the literature mostly 
concludes to the standard Meltzer and Richard (1981) argument according to which families 
with incomes below the mean would have an incentive to vote in favour of redistributive 
policies. If this is the case, each family vote as a unit (i.e., there are no gender gaps in the 
political preferences of the family members) and the so-called family vote hypothesis is 
validated (see Morgan-Collins and Teele, 2018 for more details on this). 
The possibility of a gender gap in political preferences emerges when marriage is treated as 
an incomplete contract that could be potentially terminated. In this case, both men and 
women have an incentive to support their outside options by voting for economic policies 
that affect positively these options, even when they differ from those preferred by their 
spouse (see Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006). In modern times, the obvious way of “walking 
away” from a family is divorce and thus a large number of scholars place the spotlight on 
the effect of divorce on gender gap in political preferences (see, e.g., Edlund and Pande, 
2002; Edlund, 2006). However, marriage is not a precondition for forming households and 
nor is the divorce the only way to walk away from a marriage. For example, in hunter 
gathered societies, men and women formed households, or families, but they did not get 
married in the modern meaning of the term (see Dahlberg, 1981). In agricultural societies 
marriage became a usual social norm. However, it was still common for men to withdraw 
from their families by abandoning both physically and economically their wives and children 
(see Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2010). Therefore, focusing strictly on the economic 
 
14 The origins of this social stigma norm lie on the following rationale. Only a husband who is lazy and careless of 
his family would allow his wife to be employed in such a “loud, dirty and dangerous” working position, as those 
available in the manufacturing sector during the early stages of industrialization.  
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consequences of divorce may be quite misleading in terms of explaining gender gap in 
political preferences. 
Building on the economic bargaining models of the family (see, e.g., Lundberg and Pollak, 
1996 for a review of this literature), a number of studies suggest that the ability to walk 
away from the family depends critically on having skills and assets that can be applied easily 
outside the household (see Estevan-Abe, 1999; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2010). Hence, the 
division of labour between marketable skills and household specific skills (that is, skills 
which cannot be applied easily outside the household like children bearing and rearing) 
between spouses appears to be of great importance for the relative bargaining power of 
each family member. If one spouse has all of its own skills closely tied to the household, the 
cost of walking away from the family for this specific spouse can be prohibitive and this 
inevitably affects its economic behaviour and political preferences.  
Starting from Tilly and Scott (1978), a large number of scholars highlight the importance of 
the model of production on issues related to gender equality and gender differences on 
political preferences. More recently, Iversen and Rosenbluth (2010) argue that when the 
model of production generates limited demand for female labour (e.g., early stages of 
industrialization) women are obliged to allocate most of their time to household activities, 
thus investing in household-specific skills which are non-valuable outside of the family. This 
loss of economic independence restricts the available “exit options” of women and gives 
rise to social norms according to which marriage is the ultimate goal for a woman. This is 
because, if the family were to break up, the man has the option to take his marketable skills 
and start a new family, while the woman, who is mostly equipped with household specific 
skills, would face a significant drop in her economic welfare. Thus, in an economic 
environment characterized by limited demand for female labour force participation, women 
support more vigorously –  than their male counterparts –  the sanctity and the strength of 
family values and tend to vote more conservatively compared to their husbands, giving rise 
to the traditional gender voting gap (see Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2010).  
Following a similar rationale, in an economic environment in which the demand for female 
labour force participation increases, the modern gender voting gap emerges, since the 
female electorate is expected to support left-wing parties that are more likely to adopt pro-
welfare policies. This is because welfare policies achieve a partial socialization of family 
work (such as child care and elderly care) and allow women to invest in marketable skills 
that boost their income and the level of their economic independence (see Iversen and 
Rosenbluth, 2006; Iversen et al., 2005). In other words, by lifting some of the family burdens 
on the public budget, women are relieved from a number of non-marketable household 
activities, being free to invest in marketable skills just as their male counterparts.  
2.2 The U-shaped relationship between economic development and female 
labour force participation 
Several studies on economic development suggest that there is a U-shaped relationship 
between economic development and female labour force participation (see e.g. Durand, 
1975; Schultz, 1991; Goldin, 1995). Specifically, when incomes are extremely low and the 
agricultural sector dominates, women are in the labour force to a great extent (see Durand, 
1975; Goldin, 1995). They sometimes work in the fields along with men, but more often 
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work with the rest household members in home workshop production.15 More precisely, 
during this phase of economic development, there is an obvious productivity advantage of  
males in food production (see, e.g., Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2010), but, at the same time, a 
number of important economic activities take place in home workshop production (e.g., 
spinning, weaving and food processing) leading to a vibrant economic role for female 
labour. In other words, in an economy that agricultural sector dominates, women are not 
restricted to the standard household activities (children bearing and rearing, water and fuel 
collection, food preparation, etc), but in contrast – through home workshop production – 
they participate actively in the market. 
As incomes rise, often because of an expansion of the market or the introduction of a new 
production technology, in most societies the rates of female labour force participation fall 
(inactivity rises) (see Goldin 1990; 1995). This is because economic development increases 
the productivity outside family enterprises, shifting the locus of the production from the 
family farm and business to the factory (and in other places of wage labour). Family income 
rises because male family members work for the factory at a higher wage, whereas women 
remain labour inactive allocating their time mostly to household activities (e.g., children 
bearing and rearing) due to an income effect.16 The big question in the relevant literature is 
why women do not follow the male family members into the factory. In other words, why 
women do not exploit the option of working for a higher labour wage in the factory like 
male family members? A number of scholars suggest that the reluctance of females to enter 
the labour market outside the home, can be explained by the existence of a strong social 
stigma which is attached to manual jobs that take place outside the family (or, alternatively, 
by fixed costs, such as travel costs from home to the factory). Given that in the early stages 
of industrialization the available manual jobs in the manufacturing sector are often “loud, 
dirty and dangerous” there is a widespread and strong social stigma against wives working 
in paid manual jobs outside the home (see, e.g., Boserup, 1970; Goldin, 1990, 1995; Iversen 
and Rosenbluth, 2010). Social stigma is almost always attached to the work of women in 
traditional male-intensive industries (such as mining, iron and steel) but also exists in the 
female-intensive ones (such as clothing, textiles). The roots of this social norm lie in the 
following rationale. Only a husband who is lazy and careless of his family would allow his 
wife to do a manual job. This is because men are obliged to ensure a minimum level of living 
to their families and thus a woman employed in a manual job outside the family provides a 
clear cut signal of her husband’s laziness.17 As a consequence, if the only available working 
positions are manual jobs in the manufacturing sector, the female labour inactivity is 
expected to increase as income gets higher. 
 
15 Earlier research by Boserup (1970) has suggested that the use of plough agriculture generated a division of 
labour where men worked in the fields and women specialized in work within home. This is because the use of 
plough requires significant physical strength and this gives a clear cut productivity advantage to the males in 
food production. More recently, a number of studies provide evidence that, in societies that did not use the 
plough, women tended to participate in the agriculture as actively as men, and this appears to have persistent 
effects on the contemporaneous beliefs about gender equality (Alesina et al., 2013) or even on the modern sex 
ratio (Alesina et al., 2018). 
16 See Goldin (1995) for a formal theoretical model that builds upon Gronau (1977). 
17 Interestingly, this stigma does not appear to attach to widows (who are definitely in need) or to women 
working in the white-collar sector (such as teachers, nurses, clerical work). This is because working in the white-
collar sector requires some level of education and across many cultures highly educated women are given 
license to work for pay. Thus, if higher class women are given the privilege of working in these sectors, then 
lower income women can work as well. This is because, by working in the white-collar sector, a wife does not 
signal that her husband is lazy or negligent since she could be a highly educated woman married to hard-
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Women start to participate more actively in the paid labour force, when female education 
improves and they are enabled to work in non-manual jobs due to their increased human 
capital.18 This takes place in later phases of industrialization (particularly with the rise of 
service jobs in retail, banking insurance and clerical work), but even more in post-industrial 
service economies (see, e.g., Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006; 2010). The rise of service jobs 
combined with the improvement in female education raise the value of women’s time away 
from the family and thus a substitution effect is starting to operate. At this stage of 
economic development – and since there is no social stigma attached to women working in 
the white-collar sector – the substitution effect dominates and the rate of female labour 
force participation is starting to rise again. Therefore, the falling (rising) portion of the U-
shaped curve of female labour force participation (inactivity) can be explained by the 
income effect (and the social stigma attached to manual jobs outside the home), which 
appears to be dominant during the early phases of industrialization. On the other hand, the 
second half of the U-shaped curve comes as a result of the substitution effect that 
dominates in later phases, particularly after the rise of service jobs (see Goldin, 1995 for 
more details on this).   
By combining the first half of the inverse U-shaped relationship between economic 
development and female labour force inactivity, with the theoretical arguments linking 
female labour force participation/inactivity and gender gaps in political preferences 
discussed in Section 2.1, we conclude to the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: In an economy in which the agricultural sector dominates, there is no gender 
gap in voting behaviour – i.e., results are consistent to the “family vote hypothesis”.   
 
Hypothesis 1b: In an economy in which the locus of the production has been shifted from the 
family business to the factory, women vote more conservatively than males – i.e., results 
provide evidence of a “traditional gender voting gap”. 
 
According to our theoretical priors, in an early stage of economic development (i.e., 
agricultural economy) women are part of the family business and thus their political 
interests are fully aligned to those of the other family members (Goldin, 1995). Hence, 
during this phase of development voting, behaviour is not affected by the so-called “gender 
identity” which is even totally absent or rather unimportant compared to other dominant 
identities (e.g. ethnic identity or class/income interests).19 In contrast, in the phase of the 
dawn of urbanisation women’s interests differ from those of their male counterparts, since 
male family members work outside family business whereas women stay labour inactive at 
 
18 More precisely, as income rises, education resources are freed and both male and female human capital rise. 
However, female education rates rise faster and begins to converge to those of males (see Durand, 1975; 
Schultz, 1991). 
19 The absence of “gender consciousness” in voting behaviour can be also attributed to the limited role of the 
suffragist movements during that phase of economic development. More precisely, the relevant literature 
suggests that a strong suffragist movement defines the group interests, develops the shares consciousness 
among the member of the group, and at the same time informs politicians about the group’s preferences and 
the voters about the politician’s agendas (see Morgan-Collins, 2019; Teele 2018a; 2018b for more details on 
this). Hence, in the absence of such movements the so-called “gender identity” is expected to be poorly 
developed and the “de-jure enfranchisement” (that takes place through the extension of the voting right) is not 
translated to “de-facto enfranchisement”. In this case, women may have gained (legally) the right to vote but in 
practice vote similarly to their spouses.  
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home allocating most of their time to household activities (see Iversen and Rosenbluth, 
2010).20 The above are summarized by the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The driving force behind the difference in the voting behaviour of the female 
electorate between the two phases of economic development is women labour force 
participation/inactivity –  i.e., female labour inactivity would give rise to the “traditional 
gender voting gap”.   
 
 
2.3 Greece in the dawn of urbanization: The case of an economy in transition 
In the beginning of the 20th century Greece was still an agrarian economy with most of its 
population living in rural and semi-urban areas. As can be seen in Table A1, in 1928, 58% of 
the population was living in rural areas. However, after the end of the Second World War, 
the structure of the economy was starting to change. During the decades of 1950s and 
1960s, a large share of population moved from the countryside to the cities and a wide 
group of urban population working outside the family business was formed (see, e.g., 
Kanellopoulos, 1995). The driving forces behind this transformation were the increase in the 
number of small and medium-sized firms in the industrial sector and the gradual 
development of the white-collar sector (see Svoronos, 1981; Avdela,1990).  
 
Table1A:  Demographic Data 
 1928 1951 1971 1991 
 
Population (Total) 6,204,684 7,632,801 8,768,641 10,259,900 
Population Female >10 years old 2,449,142 2,847,955 3,729,436 4,610,708 
Inactive Total Population >10 years old  2,211,167 2,717,762 3,820,072 5,048,005 
Inactive Female Population > 10 years old  1,772,952 2,373,327 2,824,028 3,375,221 
Ratio (Inactive Female >10 /Total Female >10 ) 0.72 0.83 0.76 0.73 
Ratio (Inactive Female >10/ Inactive Total >10) 0.80 0.87 0.74 0.67 
 
Share of population living in urban areas 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.53 
Share of population living in semi-urban areas 0.09 0.15 0.13 0.12 
Share of population living in rural areas 0.58 0.47 0.44 0.35 
Urbanization Rate [(urban+semi-urban)/total] 0.42 0.53 0.65 0.72 
Notes: Population data are obtained from censuses of the ELSTAT (1928, 1951, 1971, 1991). Urbanization data are obtained from the 
Statistical Yearbook of Greece (1991). 
 
Interestingly, female labour force participation was affected negatively by increasing 
urbanization in Greece during that period. As shown in Table 1a, there seems to exist an 
inverse (direct) U-shaped relationship between urbanization and female labour force 
inactivity (participation). In particular, according to the census of 1928, when most of the 
population was living in rural areas, women were economically inactive (active) to a lower 
(higher) extent in comparison to 1951 when large shares of population moved from the 
countryside to more urbanised areas. In later decades, due to the explosive expansion of the 
service sector in Greece and the improvement of female education, female labour force 
inactivity started to drop again. The inverse (direct) U-shaped relationship between 
 
20 We develop these hypotheses by focusing solely on the two first stages of economic development (and by 
skipping the later phase characterized by the rise of the service sector) since these were the phases that 
represented the economy of Greece during the early 50s, as explained in Section 2.3. From the analysis above, 
we would also expect a modern gender voting gap at a later phase of industrialisation, where inactivity falls as 
the demand for female labour force participation especially in the service sector increases.  
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urbanization and female economic inactivity (participation) in Greece could be explained on 
the basis of the theoretical arguments discussed in the previous sub-section. Table 1B 
provides a similar message when the more detailed census data of 1961 are decomposed 
between urban, semi-urban and rural areas: female economic inactivity (participation) 
appears to be lower (higher) in rural and semi-urban areas compared to the urban ones.  
 
Table1B:  Demographic Data 
YEAR=1961 urban semi-urban rural 
Population (Total 3,628,105 1,085,856 3,674,592 
Population Female >10 years old 1,587,800 453,500 1,513,600 
Inactive Total Population >10 years old  1,626,700 402,400 1,055,500 
Inactive Female Population > 10 years old  1,235,000 309,000 806,100 
    
Ratio (Inactive Female >10  /Total Female >10 ) 0.78 0.68 0.53 
Ratio (Inactive Female >10  / Inactive Total >10) 0.76 0.77 0.76 
Notes: Population data are obtained from the 1961 census of the ELSTAT. 
 
The existence of a positive relationship between urbanization and female labour force 
inactivity in Greece during the 1950s as depicted in Table 1a, as well as the evidence in 
Table 1b that this inactivity was lower in rural and semi-urban areas compared to the urban 
ones, is very important for the purposes of our study. This is because, in the case of Greece, 
the areas that were characterized by higher levels of economically inactive women were 
urban in nature and thus we are able to isolate the effect of female labour force 
participation from other effects that take place simultaneously due to urbanization (e.g., 
increased secularization, higher divorce rates etc). Previous empirical studies that are 
seeking to establish female labour force participation as the main driving force behind 
gender gap in political preferences, employ data from developed countries during the 1960s 
and onwards (see, e.g., Manza and Brooks, 1998). The main shortcoming in these studies is 
that by focusing on these countries during that specific time period (i.e., the second half of 
the U-shaped relationship), it is very difficult to establish a convincing relationship between 
female labour force participation and gender gap in political preferences. This is because, 
during that period, a large number of structural changes took place simultaneously. More 
precisely, the expansion of the white-collar sector –  the leading force behind increased 
female labour force participation from 1960s and onwards – was accompanied by major 
shifts in cultural altitudes (e.g., increased secularization, higher divorce rates, different 
reproductive choices) in most Western societies (see Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart and Norris, 
2000). In contrast, in the case of Greece during the early 1950, female labour force 
participation follows an exact opposite pattern compared to urbanisation and this allows us 
to exclude alternative theoretical explanations and to argue convincingly that it is indeed 
the female labour force participation (and not some other forces related to economic 
development) that drives our empirical findings.  
 
3. Empirical design 
3.1. Data and variables 
As discussed in Section 1, women in Greece voted for the first time in by-elections that took 
place in seven prefecture-wide electoral constituencies from 1953 to 1954. The empirical 
analysis of this paper is based on a dataset of 385 communities located in these seven 
constituencies. Nearly 30% of the sampled communities (111) were located in Thessaloniki, 
which is the second most urbanized prefecture of Greece after the capital city of Athens and 
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witnessed two by-elections over this short period; on 18 January 1953 and on 24 January 
1954. The remaining 274 communities were located in the (predominantly) rural 
constituencies of Drama, Epidavros-Limira, Evros, Grevena, Phthiotis and Rethymno, with 
one by-election being held in each constituency either in 1953 or in 1954.21 
Detailed voting results for the 1953/54 by-elections and the pre-reform general elections of 
1951 and 1952 were retrieved from the historical archives of the Ministry of Interior in 
Greece, whereas data for socio-economic variables were obtained from the 1951 and 1961 
censuses of the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT).22 Since this information was only 
available in a scanned format, we used the ‘Optical Character Recognition’ software to 
convert the scanned documents into text editable files.23 Thus, an additional contribution of 
this paper is the resulting unique dataset, which creates opportunities to evaluate electoral 
outcomes at the community-level during a period of great importance for women in Greece. 
Dependent variable. Our dependent variable 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 measures the vote share 
of parties with a given political ideology in community i at election time t.24 We construct 
this variable for three blocks of parties that dominated the political landscape in Greece 
between 1951 and 1954: the right parties (Greek Rally and People’s Party); the center-
liberal parties (National Progressive Center Union, Liberal Party, Agricultural and Labour 
Party, and Georgios Papandreou Party); and the left parties (United Democratic Left and 
Socialist Party of Greece).25 The party system in Greece was stable over the studied period, 
which allows us to explore the changes in the electoral support for these parties before and 
after the suffrage reform. 
Main independent variable. Our main independent variable to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b is 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒 that captures the proportion of eligible (registered) women 
voters in the electorate in community i at the time of the 1953/54 by-elections (Bye) and is 
calculated as follows: 
 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖1952𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒  
Figure 1 shows the kernel density of this variable.26 An immediate and important 
observation is that there is a wide variance in the share of women in the post-reform 
electorate across the sampled communities, with 90% of observations lying between 35% 
and 59%. The median is nearly 50%, while the lower and upper percentiles take values of 
 
21 The by-elections in these six constituencies took place on the following dates: 29 March 1953 (Grevena and 
Rethymno); 27 September 1953 (Evros); 6 December 1953 (Epidavros-Limira); 24 January 1954 (Drama); 14 
March 1954 (Phthiotis). 
22 The information from the censuses is available in many cases at a more disaggregated community level 
compared to the election records. To make the data from the two sources comparable, we aggregated the 
information for the census communities up to the level of the election record communities, using either the 
sum of the census community values (for population-based variables) or the population-weighted average of 
these values (for the remaining variables). 
23 Figure B1 in Appendix 3 shows an example of a scanned document reporting part of the electoral results for 
the second by-election held in Thessaloniki. 
24 In a few cases, registered voters from different geographic communities voted in the same polling station and 
thus it would be more accurate to use the term “electoral community” to define the main administrative unit of 
our analysis. However, for brevity reasons, we refer to “electoral communities” as simply “communities”.     
25 In Section 4.4, we use a different classification that takes into account the largest party/parties in each block 
(Greek Rally as ‘right’, National Progressive Center Union and Liberal Party as ‘center-liberal’ and United 
Democratic Left as ‘left’). This alternative classification leaves our results unchanged. 
26 Following the identification tests reported in Section 4.1, the values for Thessaloniki are based on the second 
by-election. 
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around 26% and 62%, respectively. The distribution of this variable is very similar to the one 
reported in prior relevant studies for other countries (see Carruthers and Wanamaker, 2015; 
Morgan-Collins, 2019). 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of women in electorate across communities  
 
 
Interacted variable. To examine the conditionality of the gender voting gap upon the level of 
women’s labour force participation (Hypothesis 2) we consider the interactive effect of the 
variables 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒 and 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖. The latter is 
based on information from the 1961 census27 and measures the proportion of economically 
inactive women over the age of 10 in community i to the total population of women over 
the age of 10 in the same community.  
In our model specification, we also control for the effects of two additional political 
variables at the community level; namely, the percentage of total registered voters who 
actually voted in that election (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡) and the vote share of independent 
candidates (𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝐼𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑡). In addition, we control for a number of observable 
community characteristics, which are captured by the vector Xi. In particular, this vector 
includes the three-dimensional distance in kilometres between community i and the 
prefecture’s largest city28 (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖) and two variables from the 1951 
census: the logarithm of the number of inhabitants (𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑙𝑜𝑔)𝑖) and the altitude in 
meters (𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑖). Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of our main regression variables, 
while distinguishing between the prefecture of Thessaloniki and the other six prefectures of 
our sample (Rest Prefectures).29 We can see that the communities in Thessaloniki were, on 
 
27 The censuses in Greece during the period 1940-1961 were carried out roughly every ten years and data on 
social and economic characteristics of population by gender at the community level were available only in the 
1961 census. 
28 To construct this variable, we used the ArcGIS spatial analysis tool and introduced information from the 90m 
Digital Elevation Database of the NASA Shuttle Radar Topographic Mission (SRTM).  
29 The values of the electoral variables for communities in Thessaloniki are based on the second by-election, 
unless the difference between the two by-elections is taken. For regression variables based on the first by-
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average, more populated with a smaller altitude, and were located much closer to the 
prefecture’s largest city compared to the communities in Rest Prefectures. At the same 
time, they were characterized by a higher, on average, proportion of economically inactive 
women, even though the standard deviation of this variable within the two community 
groups is almost the same.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
election of Thessaloniki, or the difference between the first by-election and the 1952 election, see Table B1a in 
Appendix 3. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 All Prefectures   Thessaloniki  Rest Prefectures 
      
 Obs Mean SD Min Max  Obs Mean SD Min Max  Obs Mean SD Min Max 
PANEL I                  
Variables in levels                  
Women in Electorate Bye (%) 385 48.4 7.6 19.3 65.2  111 47.3 6.9 26.4 61.2  274 48.9 7.8 19.3 65.2 
Economically Inactive Women (%) 385 48.0 21.8 13.1 94.4  111 63.6 20.0 19.2 87.9  274 41.7 19.1 13.1 94.4 
Distance from Largest City (kilometres) 385 27.6 23.0 1.0 99.7 
 
111 17.3 16.0 1.0 64.2 
 
274 31.8 24.0 1.0 99.7 
Population (not in log) 385 2571.1 3428.2 194.0 33842.0 
 
111 4254.2 3630.7 606.0 17022.8 
 
274 1889.2 3098.6 194.0 33842.0 
Altitude (meters) 385 265.8 263.4 5.0 1030.0 
 
111 144.9 175.5 5.0 740.0 
 
274 314.8 277.2 8.0 1030.0 
Electricity Access (%) 385 24.5 32.6 0.0 98.5  111 50.7 39.2 0.0 98.5  274 13.8 22.0 0.0 88.2 
Men’s Turnout Bye (%) 88 73.2 8.0 42.9 88.8  48 73.8 6.1 59.6 86.2  40 72.6 9.9 42.9 88.8 
Women’s Electoral Support Right Bye (%) 88 44.7 15.7 16.0 95.0  48 37.9 12.8 16.0 78.5  40 52.8 15.2 28.0 95.0 
Women’s Electoral Support Left Bye (%) 88 24.0 17.3 0.0 61.3  48 35.0 12.2 12.5 61.3  40 10.8 12.8 0.0 47.2 
Women’s Electoral Support Center-Liberal Bye 
(%) 
88 28.4 11.4 3.9 60.9  48 24.3 6.8 3.9 33.3  40 33.3 13.8 5.0 60.9 
Women’s Turnout Bye (%) 88 64.4 15.1 27.2 87.4  48 64.6 16.6 27.2 87.4  40 64.2 13.3 30.1 81.0 
                  
PANEL II                  
Variables in changes                  
Δ Electoral Support Right Bye-1952 (%) 385 5.2 15.9 -32.0 52.5  111 -0.1 8.5 -21.1 22.9  274 7.3 17.6 -32.0 52.5 
Δ Electoral Support Left Bye-1952 (%) 385 2.0 6.8 -25.5 38.8  111 7.6 8.1 -25.5 38.8  274 -0.3 4.6 -20.9 23.6 
Δ Electoral Support Center-Liberal Bye-1952 
(%) 
385 -6.9 17.1 -51.7 87.3  111 -9.9 8.0 -41.8 18.1  274 -5.6 19.5 -51.7 87.3 
Δ Electoral Support Right 1952-1951 (%) 361 9.1 11.4 -33.5 87.4  108 10.8 7.3 -12.6 35.4  253 8.4 12.7 -33.5 87.4 
Δ Electoral Support Left 1952-1951 (%) 361 0.0 6.0 -44.3 30.5  108 -1.2 7.7 -44.3 19.4  253 0.5 5.1 -27.2 30.5 
Δ Electoral Support Center-Liberal 1952-1951 
(%) 
361 -11.4 13.7 -79.5 26.2  108 -9.6 9.1 -34.9 26.2  253 -12.2 15.2 -79.5 25.9 
Δ Electoral Support ICs Bye-1952 (%) 385 -0.3 8.9 -60.9 26.7  111 2.4 3.1 -0.2 25.7  274 -1.3 10.1 -60.9 26.7 
Δ Total Turnout Bye-1952 (%) 385 -12.7 13.6 -53.7 29.0  111 -17.7 12.5 -53.7 6.6  274 -10.7 13.5 -50.1 29.0 
Δ Men’s Turnout Bye-1952 (%) 88 -5.4 7.2 -31.9 22.6  48 -7.9 6.4 -31.9 3.2  40 -2.5 7.2 -17.2 22.6 
Δ Men’s Turnout 1952-1951 (%) 361 -0.6 6.8 -24.3 27.8  108 1.5 5.1 -15.5 18.4  253 -1.6 7.2 -24.3 27.8 
Δ Men’s Registration Bye-1952 88 -32.8 297.7 -1954.0 455.0  48 24.5 209.5 -749.0 455.0  40 -101.5 368.7 -1954.0 279.0 
Δ Women’s Electoral Support Right Bye2-Bye1 
(%) 
      48 0.8 11.0 -13.4 48.6       
Δ Women’s  Electoral Support Left Bye2-Bye1 (%) 
      48 5.1 4.7 -14.8 14.4       
Δ Women’s  Electoral Support Center-Liberal Bye2-Bye1 
(%) 
      48 7.0 4.3 -0.2 18.5       
Δ Women’s Turnout Bye2-Bye1 (%)       48 -3.2 8.6 -29.5 26.6       
Δ Women’s Registration Bye2-Bye1       48 15.6 66.7 -250.0 278.5       
Notes: The table reports the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of the main regression variables. The values of the electoral variables for communities in Thessaloniki are based on 
the second by-election, unless the difference between the two by-elections is taken (e.g., Δ Women’s Electoral Support Right Bye2-Bye1 (%)). For regression variables based on the first by-election of Thessaloniki, or the 
difference between the first by-election and the 1952 election see Table B1a in Appendix 3. For additional regression variables discussed in the last paragraph of Section 4.4, and reported in Appendix 3, see Table B1b.  
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3.2 Empirical model specification 
To examine the existence of a gender voting gap in the era of women’s enfranchisement in 
Greece, we employ an estimation strategy that exploits the observed heterogeneity in the 
proportion of women in the electorate across communities as the identifying source of 
variation. This method builds on the idea that communities with a larger share of women in 
the electorate received a higher ‘dosage’ of treatment and thus should exhibit stronger 
post-reform support for parties of a certain political ideology; for instance, stronger support 
for right parties if the ‘traditional voting gap’ thesis holds. Specifically, drawing upon the 
recent works of Carruthers and Wanamaker (2015) and Morgan-Collins (2019) 30 and using 
the variables defined in the previous section, we estimate a difference-in-differences 
specification that takes the following form: 
  𝛥 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒−1952= 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒 + 𝜃1𝑋𝑖 + 𝜃2𝛥𝑍𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒−1952+ 𝛥𝜀𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒−1952     (1) 
 
where 𝛥 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒−1952 is community i’s change in the electoral support for 
right, left or center-liberal parties between the first election after the enfranchisement and 
the last election before the enfranchisement, 𝛥𝑍𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒 captures community i’s changes in 
total turnout and the electoral support for independent candidates between the two 
elections; and 𝛥𝜀𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒−1952 is an i.i.d. error term.  
Using a specification in changes rather than levels eliminates any unobserved, community-
specific and time-invariant characteristics that may confound the true relationship between 
suffrage and party vote shares. However, we are still concerned that this approach does not 
control for unobserved time-varying characteristics that could be correlated with the 
outcome of interest, leading to biased and inconsistent estimates of the suffrage effect. For 
instance, it is possible that unobserved and heterogeneous trends in omitted variables are 
more prevalent in high-dosage communities and that these omitted variables cause a faster 
growth in the support for right parties that we falsely attribute to suffrage (Vernby, 2013; 
Carruthers and Wanamaker, 2015). To tackle this possibility, we augment Eq. (1) with the 
lagged value of our dependent variable 𝛥 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖1952−1951 (capturing the 
change in partisan outcomes between the two pre-reform general elections of 1951 and 
1952) and add prefecture fixed effects.31 As the dependent variable is a difference, such 
fixed effects capture prefecture-specific shocks. To further ensure that our estimates do not 
reflect pre-reform trends in party vote shares, we follow a standard approach in the 
literature and perform placebo tests. Specifically, we re-run Eq. (1) using 𝛥 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖1952−1951 as the dependent variable and test if 𝛽 = 0. Failure to 
reject this hypothesis confirms that our results are not influenced by pre-existing trends in 
communities mostly affected by the reform that were simply “catching-up”.  
 
30 The idea of using the ‘dosage’ of suffrage was firstly introduced by Berlinski and Dewan (2011) and was 
subsequently applied by several studies to investigate the political and economic outcomes of men’s and 
women’s enfranchisement (see, e.g., Vernby, 2013; Carruthers and Wanamaker, 2014; Larcinese, 2014; Kroth et 
al., 2015). 
31 The administrative divisions of Greece at that time were the following: (i) periphery; (ii) prefecture; (iii) 
province; (iv) municipality; and (v) community. 
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To test whether the direction and magnitude of the gender voting gap is different for 
communities located in rural versus more urbanized areas (as suggested by Hypotheses 1a 
and 1b), we carry out the analysis above separately for Thessaloniki and Rest 
Constituencies. Furthermore, to test whether these differences are driven by the level of 
labour market participation among women (as suggested by Hypothesis 2), we add to the 
right-hand-side of Eq. (1) the proportion of economically inactive women and its interaction 
with the ‘dosage’ of treatment as follows:  
 𝛥 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒−1952 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒 +𝛾𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖 + 𝛿𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒 ∗𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖 + 𝜃1𝑋𝑖 + 𝜃2𝛥𝑍𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒−1952 + 𝛥𝜀𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒−1952         (2)  
 
Support for the conditionality of the ‘traditional voting gap argument’ upon the level of 
economically inactive women can be inferred from the estimated parameter 𝛿 being 
positive and statistically significant in the regressions for right parties, and negative and 
statistically significant in the regressions for left or center-liberal parties. To address the 
possibility of measurement errors and biases arising from using the 1961 census to 
construct the variable 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖, we check robustness to excluding 
communities with large population changes between the years 1951 and 1961. To further 
corroborate our findings, we also consider a number of alternative specifications and 
robustness tests, which we discuss in Section 4.4.  
     
3.3. Identification threats 
Greece offers an ideal setting for exploring the causal impact of women’s suffrage on 
partisan outcomes, as it meets all the case selection criteria outlined in Morgan-Collins 
(2019). First, the suffrage reform took place at the national level and involved all women 
regardless of personal characteristics (such as education and income) and thus it was not 
endogenous to the proportion of women in the electorate across communities. Second, the 
electoral system and the parties dominating the political landscape in Greece between 
1951-1954 did not change, which allows us to compare party vote changes before and after 
the reform.32  Third, the suffrage reform was not concurrent with any other electoral 
reforms, and thus there are no concerns of ‘multiple treatments’. Fourth, data from two 
elections prior to women’s enfranchisement are available, enabling us to perform ‘placebo’ 
tests and investigate the plausibility of the parallel trends assumption discussed above.  
The case of Greece, however, poses three additional advantages that are crucial for our 
identification strategy. First, the reform came as a result of exogenous international 
pressures and it was not the outcome of domestic claims from certain parties, which avoids 
the problem of reverse causality; that is, women repaying their dues to the party or parties 
that gave them political rights – see Appendix 1 for more details on this. Second, the 
1953/54 by-elections (where women voted for the first time in general election) were held 
in order to fill seats that became vacant due to the death of an elected MP or because of 
 
32 The electoral system over the period 1951-1954 was purely majoritarian. On the other hand,  in the 1956 
general election, where women voted across the whole Greek territory, the parties competed under a complex 
and controversial electoral system enacted by PM Konstantinos Karamanlis: a 'reinforced' (weighted) 
proportional representation system, the so-called “trifasiko” (see, e.g., Nikolakopoulos, 2001). 
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cancellation of the 1952 election result by the electoral court. As such, the timing of these 
by-elections was exogenous to economic conditions and parties' influence. Third, in nearly 
one quarter of the sampled communities (48 in Thessaloniki and 40 in Rest Prefectures), 
men and women voted in different polling stations at the time of the by-elections. Using this 
sub-sample, to be referred to as the ‘restricted sample’, we can perform additional tests and 
rule out alternative explanations for our findings (see Morgan-Collins, 2019). 
The first remaining concern associated with our identification strategy is that men 
responded endogenously to women’s suffrage. If, for instance, men mobilized at higher 
levels in communities with a higher proportion of women in the electorate, then the 
resulting effects of suffrage could be driven by men’s rather than women’s voting 
behaviour. To address this issue, we exploit the restricted sample of communities, and 
investigate the impact of treatment on men’s turnout at the by-elections 
(𝑀𝑒𝑛’𝑠 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒) and on the change in men’s turnout between 1952 and the by-
elections (𝛥 𝑀𝑒𝑛’𝑠 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒−1952). Since men’s registration level in community i is not 
constant over time and its change may be correlated with the treatment variable, we also 
present estimates where we control for the change in men’s local registration levels, via the 
term 𝛥 𝑀𝑒𝑛’𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐵𝑦𝑒−1952.  
The second remaining concern associated with our identification strategy is that women 
supporting different parties had different turnout rates. If, for some reason, right women 
mobilized at higher levels compared to left or center-liberal women in certain communities, 
then our results could be the outcome of increased electoral participation rather than 
exposure to treatment. To tackle this possibility, we again exploit the restricted sample, and 
examine the impact of women’s turnout at the by-elections (𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛’𝑠 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒) on 
women’s electoral support for right, left or center-liberal parties at the same elections, as 
captured by 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛′𝑠 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒. 
As mentioned in Section 3.1, Thessaloniki witnessed two by-elections over the studied 
period. An important and unique characteristic of the first by-election in Thessaloniki was 
that the candidates of the right party (Greek Rally) and the center-liberal coalition (National 
Progressive Center Union and Liberal Party) were women,33 as opposed to the by-elections 
in Rest Prefectures and the second by-election in Thessaloniki, where all candidates were 
men. This means that regression results based on the first by-election in Thessaloniki are 
much more likely to suffer from the identification problems discussed in the last two 
paragraphs. Having women standing as candidates may have indeed created incentives for 
men to turnout at higher levels in localities with a higher proportion of women electors, 
and, at the same time, may have induced a higher mobilization of women supporting the 
relevant parties. Following this argument, we perform the tests described in this section for 
both by-elections in Thessaloniki, and, based on the outcome of these tests, we select the 
sample(s) to be used for the estimation of Eqs. (1) and (2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 Helen Skoura (right) was elected the first woman MP, and, together with Virginia Zanna (center-liberal), were 
the first two women candidates for office. Paradoxically, Helen Skoura had supported the postponement of 
women’s suffrage during the Civil War. 
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4. Empirical findings 
 
4.1 Identification tests and sample selection 
We start our analysis by examining whether the proportion of women in the electorate at 
the by-elections influenced men’s turnout, based on information from the restricted sample 
of communities. To do so, we adopt an ‘incremental’ strategy and estimate alternative 
specifications where we progressively add new controls. In particular, we start from a 
simple specification that regresses men’s turnout rate (𝑀𝑒𝑛’𝑠 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒) on our 
treatment variable, and then add the change in men’s registration levels between 1952 and 
the by-elections (𝛥 𝑀𝑒𝑛’𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐵𝑦𝑒−1952), the variables included in vector Xi, and 
finally the change in men’s turnout between the two elections preceding the women’s 
enfranchisement (𝛥 𝑀𝑒𝑛’𝑠 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖1952−1951). Columns (1)-(4) of Table 3 display the 
corresponding results on three different panels.34 Panel I features estimates for the first by-
election in Thessaloniki (Thessaloniki Bye1), Panel II for the second by-election in 
Thessaloniki (Thessaloniki Bye2), and Panel III for the by-elections in Rest Prefectures. 
Overall, we find evidence that men’s turnout was higher in communities with a higher 
proportion of women in the electorate: the estimated coefficient on the treatment variable 
is positive, large in magnitude, and reaches high levels of statistical significance across all 
three panels, especially when we consider more refined specifications, such as those of 
columns (3) and (4). While adding new controls improves the explanatory power of the 
model and produces more reliable estimates, these estimates are all subject to the 
limitation that unobserved fixed community characteristics are not accounted for. We thus 
follow the key identification strategy described in Section 3.2, and re-run all regressions 
using the change in men’s turnout between 1952 and the by-elections 
(𝛥 𝑀𝑒𝑛’𝑠 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒−1952) as the dependent variable. As shown in columns (5)-(8) of 
Table 3, once fixed community characteristics are held constant, the positive and 
statistically significant effect of 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒 survives only in the regressions 
for Thessaloniki Bye1. This suggests that men mobilized at higher levels to ‘negate’ the 
effect of women’s vote only when women stood as candidates for office. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 To make sure that men’s registration levels before and after the reform are comparable, specifications in 
columns (2)-(4) exclude communities with at least one mixed-gender polling station at the by-elections; that is, 
they are estimated for the sample of communities where all polling stations were separated by gender. 
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Table 3: The effect of women’s suffrage on men’s turnout (restricted sample) 
 
 
Did women’s electoral participation rates influence their vote choices? To answer this 
question, we utilize again the restricted sample of communities and regress women’s 
turnout at the by-elections (𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛’𝑠 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒) on women’s electoral support for right, 
left or center-liberal parties at the same elections (𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛′𝑠 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒). The 
results, displayed in columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table 4A, generally show negative 
coefficients for right parties and positive coefficients for left and center-liberal parties. 
However, the corresponding estimates vary significantly across the three panels with 
respect to their size and t-statistic, and respond strongly to the addition of vector Xi. Indeed, 
once we control for the community characteristics included in vector Xi (see columns (2), (4) 
and (6) of Table 4A), the estimations return much smaller and statistically insignificant 
coefficients on 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛’𝑠 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒, with the exception of the regressions for center-
liberal parties in Thessaloniki Bye1. This indicates that center-liberal parties enjoyed a larger 
vote share among women (at the first by-election in Thessaloniki) in communities where 
women mobilized at higher levels.  
Table 3: The effect of women’s suffrage on men’s turnout (restricted sample) 
Dependent Variable (DV): Men’s Turnout Bye (%)  Δ Men’s Turnout Bye-1952 (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PANEL I 
Thessaloniki Bye1 
         
Women in Electorate Bye (%) 0.56*** 0.61*** 0.72*** 0.73***  -0.08 -0.03 0.14* 0.17** 
 
(5.21) (5.31) (5.62) (4.95)  (0.84) (0.31) (1.81) (2.22) 
Obs. 49 45 45 44  49 45 45 44 
R2 
 
PANEL II 
Thessaloniki Bye2 
0.34 0.40 0.50 0.50  0.01 0.21 0.56 0.62 
Women in Electorate Bye (%) 0.11 0.31 0.52*** 0.55***  -0.52** -0.32 -0.06 -0.02 
 
(0.52) (1.65) (3.19) (2.97)  (2.58) (1.65) (0.47) (0.15) 
Obs. 48 44 44 43  48 44 44 43 
R2 0.01 0.32 0.49 0.49  0.25 0.54 0.75 0.80 
 
PANEL III 
Rest Constituencies 
    
 
    
Women in Electorate Bye (%) -0.00 0.21 0.41 0.83**  -0.16 -0.17 -0.06 0.16 
 
(0.01) (0.82) (1.54) (2.67)  (0.94) (0.84) (0.31) (0.87) 
Obs. 40 34 34 32  40 34 34 32 
R2 0.00 0.05 0.30 0.45  0.03 0.28 0.61 0.75 
          
Communities ALL NM NM NM  ALL NM NM NM 
          
Controls          
Δ Men’s Registration Bye-1952  ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Vector Xi   ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓ 
Δ Men’s Turnout 1952-1951 (%)    ✓     ✓ 
Notes: ‘ALL’ includes all communities with polling stations separated by gender; ‘NM’ (no mixed-gender) excludes communities with at least 
one mixed-gender polling station; Vector Xi includes the variables: Population (log), Altitude, and Distance from Largest City; Regressions are 
estimated using robust standard errors and include a constant; t-statistics in parentheses; ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 
10% confidence level respectively. 
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A possible interpretation of the latter finding is that center-liberal women were more 
supportive of electing women to office, compared to right women who tended to agree 
with the idea that “politics must be men’s prerogative” (see Pantelidou Maloutas, 1992). 
Hence, center-liberal women mobilized at higher levels at the first by-election in 
Thessaloniki (compared to the second by-election in Thessaloniki and the by-elections in 
Rest Prefectures) to vote for the woman representing their party in that electoral race, 
whereas right women did not respond in the same way. To provide further empirical 
support for this interpretation, we estimate a DD specification using the 1953 and 1954 by-
elections in Thessaloniki; that is, we regress the change in party vote shares among women 
between the two by-elections (𝛥 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛′𝑠 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒2−𝐵𝑦𝑒1) on the change in 
turnout rates among women between the two by-elections 
(𝛥 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛’𝑠 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒2−𝐵𝑦𝑒1). As shown in Table 4B, a negative and statistically 
significant effect is found for center-liberal parties (column (7)), which persists when we 
control for the change in women’s registration levels between the two by-elections 
(𝛥 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛’𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒2−𝐵𝑦𝑒1) and when we add to the estimation vector Xi (see 
columns (8) and (9)). In line with the above arguments, center-liberal women in Thessaloniki 
 
 
Table 4A: The effect of women’s turnout on women’s electoral support (restricted sample) 
Dependent Variable (DV): Women’s Electoral Support Bye (%) 
 Right   Left  Center-Liberal 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
PANEL I 
Thessaloniki Bye1 
        
Women’s Turnout Bye (%) -0.02 0.05  0.08 -0.04  0.26*** 0.26*** 
 
(0.20) (0.37) 
 
(0.66) (0.17) 
 
(5.06) (3.69) 
Obs. 49 49 
 
49 49 
 
49 49 
R2 0.00 0.06 
 
0.01 0.08 
 
0.44 0.46 
         
PANEL II 
Thessaloniki Bye2 
        
Women’s Turnout Bye (%) -0.41*** -0.11  0.14 -0.03  0.22*** 0.13 
 
(3.66) (0.96) 
 
(1.04) (0.16) 
 
(3.19) (1.17) 
Obs. 48 48 
 
48 48 
 
48 48 
R2 0.29 0.50 
 
0.04 0.14 
 
0.29 0.39 
         
PANEL III 
Rest Constituencies 
        
Women’s Turnout Bye (%) -0.23 -0.12  0.24** 0.14  -0.14 -0.13 
 
(1.40) (0.78) 
 
(2.46) (1.32) 
 
(0.88) (0.66) 
Obs. 40 40 
 
40 40 
 
40 40 
R2 0.04 0.19 
 
0.06 0.18 
 
0.02 0.19 
         
Communities ALL ALL  ALL ALL  ALL ALL 
         
Controls         
Vector Xi  ✓   ✓   ✓ 
Notes: ‘ALL’ includes all communities with polling stations separated by gender; Vector Xi includes the variables: 
Population (log), Altitude, and Distance from Largest City; Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and 
include a constant; t-statistics in parentheses; ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence 
level respectively. 
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probably decreased their electoral participation in the second by-election (where all 
candidates were men), resulting in larger losses for center-liberal parties in communities 
where women mobilized at higher levels in the second rather than the first by-election. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In sum, the analysis in this section reveals that having women as candidates in the first by-
election of Thessaloniki creates a ‘backdoor’ pathway from treatment to outcome: changes 
in party vote shares between 1952 and the by-elections can be explained, to some extent, 
by an endogenous response of men to women’s suffrage and an increased electoral 
participation of center-liberal women. To be able to claim with confidence that our results 
capture the causal impact of women’s suffrage on party votes shares, our estimation of Eqs. 
(1) and (2) will be based on the second by-election in Thessaloniki and the by-elections in 
Rest Prefectures, for which there is no evidence – at least in the restricted sample of 
communities – in favour of such alternative explanations.  
The availability of the restricted sample of communities – where both male and female 
turnouts are known – also permits the opportunity to verify the accuracy of our approach to 
ecological inference (Corder and Wolbrecht, 2006). If women voters were simply an 
unpredictable or volatile addition to the electorate, then the estimation of intent-to-treat 
effects (as implied by Eqs. (1) and (2)) would fail to capture women’s political preferences. 
Table B2 in Appendix 3 shows that our treatment variable is positively related to women’s 
share of the overall turnout (women-to-total voters) for both chosen sub-samples: 
Thessaloniki Bye2 and Rest Prefectures. This suggests that, in communities with more 
eligible (registered) women, there were more women voters relative to men voters, 
providing support for the use of 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒 as the ‘dosage’ of exposure to 
the suffrage treatment (see also Morgan-Collins, 2019). 
Table 4B: The effect of change in women’s turnout on change in women’s electoral support in 
Thessaloniki (restricted sample) 
Dependent Variable (DV):  Δ Women’s Electoral Support Bye2-Bye1 (%) 
 Right  Left  Center-Liberal 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Δ Women’s Turnout Bye2-Bye1 
(%) 
0.01 -0.23 -0.32 
 
0.09 0.08 0.19 
 
-
0.12
* 
-
0.24
* 
-
0.28
* 
 
(0.05
) 
(0.47
) 
(0.74
) 
 
(0.73
) 
(0.50
) 
(1.24
) 
 
(1.83
) 
(1.82
) 
(1.95
) 
Obs. 48 48 48 
 
48 48 48 
 
48 48 48 
R2 0.00 0.03 0.42 
 
0.03 0.03 0.16 
 
0.06 0.11 0.25 
            
Communities ALL ALL ALL  ALL ALL ALL  ALL ALL ALL 
            
Controls            
Δ Women’s Registration Bye2-
Bye1 
 ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ 
Vector Xi   ✓    ✓    ✓ 
Notes: ‘ALL’ includes all communities with polling stations separated by gender; Vector Xi includes the variables: 
Population (log), Altitude, and Distance from Largest City; Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and 
include a constant; t-statistics in parentheses; ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level 
respectively. 
 
 
22 
 
 
4.2 Baseline results: the traditional gender voting gap argument 
We now proceed to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b using the change in party vote shares as the 
dependent variable and the proportion of women in the electorate as the main independent 
variable, as in Eq. (1). Table 5 shows the corresponding estimates for the restricted sample 
of communities, while distinguishing between Thessaloniki Bye2 and Rest Prefectures. As 
before, we report results from several specifications, starting with a simple regression and 
progressively including the following controls: the lagged dependent variable (DV) as 
captured by the change in party vote shares between 1951 and 1952 
(𝛥 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖1952−1951), the change in men’s registration levels between 1952 and 
the by-elections (𝛥 𝑀𝑒𝑛’𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐵𝑦𝑒−1952), and the variables included in vector Xi. 
We finally include changes (between 1952 and the by-elections) in the vote share of 
independent candidates and the total turnout rate, via the terms 𝛥 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝐼𝐶𝑠𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒−1952 and 𝛥 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒−1952. As a first point, we can 
notice that our results lend strong support to Hypothesis 1b: there is strong evidence in 
favour of the traditional gender voting gap thesis for communities in Thessaloniki, which is 
by far the most urbanised prefecture of our sample. Specifically, the coefficient of interest 
for right parties has the expected positive sign, is statistically significant at the 1% 
confidence level, and retains its size and statistical significance across specifications 
(columns (1)-(5) of Panel I). Furthermore, we can see that the pro-right shift in Thessaloniki 
caused by women’s suffrage was combined with withdrawal of support for center-liberal 
parties, even though the corroborating evidence is statistically weak and unstable across 
specifications (columns (11)-(15) of Panel I). Finally, our results fail to reveal a clear pattern 
of suffrage-induced voting differences for communities in the rural prefectures of our 
sample (see Panel II) – in line with Hypothesis 1a – and the absence of such effects is robust 
to alternative specifications.  
As a preliminary test for Hypothesis 2, we focus on the prefecture of Thessaloniki and 
augment Eq. (1) with the binary variable Municipality of Thessaloniki and its interaction 
term with our dosage variable. The logic behind this test is that, within the Municipality of 
Thessaloniki (i.e., the city centre of Thessaloniki), the level of inactiveness is significantly 
higher compared to the rest areas of Thessaloniki when looking at the restricted sample.35 
As can be seen in Table B3 in Appendix 3, consistent with our expectations, the interaction 
term is negative and statistically significant for  the centre-liberal party, though this effect 
becomes weaker when all controls are added. Although this first evidence does not seem 
supportive for Hypothesis 2, in the next section (Section 4.3), we test more formally for the 
role of economically inactive women based on Eq. (2) and the full sample of communities. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
35 In particular, the inactiveness in the city centre of Thessaloniki is 79.01 percent – 10 percentage points higher, 
on average, compared to the rest of the observations in the restricted sub-sample ‘Thessaloniki Bye2’. We 
prefer here the simplistic approach of using dichotomous variation because the majority of our observations – 
i.e., electoral communities that come from the Municipality of Thessaloniki – take the same value in the census 
(i.e., 79.01 percent). Moreover, we perform this test only for Thessaloniki, because, in Rest Prefectures, there is 
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Table 5: The effect of women’s suffrage on change in electoral support (restricted sample) 
Dependent Variable (DV): Δ Electoral Support Bye-1952 (%) 
 Right  Left  Center-Liberal 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
PANEL I 
Thessaloniki Bye2 
                 
Women in Electorate Bye (%) 0.48*** 0.52*** 0.65*** 0.51*** 0.49*** 
 
-0.27 -0.21 -0.31 -0.15 -0.18 
 
-0.14 -0.25 -0.35** -0.33 -0.22 
 
(3.55) (4.44) (6.72) (5.27) (4.93) 
 
(1.21) (0.86) (1.16) (0.71) (0.87) 
 
(1.00) (1.62) (2.05) (1.65) (1.18) 
Obs. 48 47 43 43 43 
 
48 47 43 43 43 
 
48 47 43 43 43 
R2 0.34 0.49 0.62 0.71 0.77 
 
0.09 0.13 0.16 0.28 0.41 
 
0.04 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.41 
                  
PANEL II 
Rest Constituencies 
                 
Women in Electorate Bye (%) -0.35 -0.31 0.08 0.10 0.14 
 
-0.03 0.03 -0.05 0.27 0.27 
 
0.44** 0.35 0.08 -0.44 -0.27 
 
(1.46) (1.47) (0.37) (0.36) (0.46) 
 
(0.23) (0.20) (0.17) (0.83) (0.79) 
 
(2.40) (1.50) (0.17) (0.98) (0.63) 
Obs. 40 38 32 32 32 
 
40 38 32 32 32 
 
40 38 32 32 32 
R2 0.07 0.30 0.21 0.29 0.31 
 
0.00 0.04 0.07 0.32 0.33 
 
0.05 0.19 0.20 0.45 0.64 
                  
Communities ALL ALL NM NM NM  ALL ALL NM NM NM  ALL ALL NM NM NM 
                  
Controls                  
Lagged DV 1952-1951 (%)  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Δ Men’s Registration Bye-1952   ✓ ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Vector Xi    ✓ ✓     ✓ ✓     ✓ ✓ 
Δ Electoral Support ICs Bye-1952 (%)     ✓      ✓      ✓ 
Δ Total Turnout Bye-1952 (%)     ✓      ✓      ✓ 
Notes: ‘ALL’ includes all communities with polling stations separated by gender; ‘NM’ (no mixed-gender) excludes communities with at least one mixed-gender polling station; Vector Xi includes the variables: 
Population (log), Altitude, and Distance from Largest City; Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and include a constant; t-statistics in parentheses; ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% confidence level respectively. 
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Next, Table 6 replicates the specifications of Table 5 using the full sample of communities 
(111 in Thessaloniki and 274 in Rest Prefectures). Since the number of observations for Rest 
Prefectures is now seven times larger, we add to the estimations prefecture-specific shocks, 
which allow us to control for fixed spatial autocorrelation.36 Results are remarkably 
consistent with those of Table 5. Once again, we find strong evidence in favour of the 
traditional gender voting gap thesis in the case of Thessaloniki (right parties achieving 
higher vote shares in communities which were more affected by the reform) and no 
relationship between suffrage and partisan outcomes in the case of Rest Prefectures. In 
comparison to the restricted sample in Table 5, when all communities in Thessaloniki are 
taken into account, the (negative) suffrage effect for center-liberal parties appears to be 
more pronounced and reaches high levels of statistical significance across all specifications. 
The magnitude of the coefficient represents the effect of an increase in the treatment 
variable by one percentage point on the dependent variable, and ranges from 0.38 to 0.62 
for right parties and from -0.26 to -0.38 for center-liberal parties in Thessaloniki. The lower 
bounds suggest that a one-standard deviation increase in the proportion of women in the 
electorate leads to an increase in the vote share of right parties by at least 2.6 percentage 
points, and a decrease in the vote share of center-liberal parties by at least 1.8 percentage 
points; which are both large effects. 
 
 
 
 
36 The specifications of Table 6 do not control for the variable 𝛥 𝑀𝑒𝑛’𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐵𝑦𝑒−1952 since most 
communities in the full sample include at least one mixed-gender polling station, and thus men’s registration 
levels before and after the reform are not comparable. 
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Table 6: The effect of women’s suffrage on change in electoral support (full sample) 
Dependent Variable (DV): Δ Electoral Support Bye-1952 (%) 
 Right  Left  Center-Liberal 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
PANEL I 
Thessaloniki Bye2 
              
Women in Electorate Bye (%) 0.53*** 0.62*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 
 
-0.22** -0.23** -0.07 -0.12 
 
-0.26** -0.38*** -0.27** -0.26* 
 
(4.18) (4.91) (3.79) (3.35) 
 
(2.17) (2.00) (0.68) (1.01) 
 
(2.61) (3.07) (2.39) (1.87) 
Obs. 111 108 108 108 
 
111 108 108 108 
 
111 108 108 108 
R2 0.18 0.25 0.47 0.61 
 
0.04 0.06 0.32 0.34 
 
0.05 0.12 0.27 0.28 
               
PANEL II 
Rest Constituencies 
              
Women in Electorate Bye (%) 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.08 
 
-0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
-0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.09 
 
(0.40) (0.77) (0.60) (0.75) 
 
(0.12) (0.34) (0.29) (0.46) 
 
(0.06) (0.51) (0.31) (0.85) 
Obs. 274 253 253 253 
 
274 253 253 253 
 
274 253 253 253 
R2 0.52 0.56 0.57 0.58 
 
0.23 0.29 0.30 0.30 
 
0.56 0.61 0.61 0.64 
               
Controls               
Constituency Fes ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Lagged DV 1952-1951 (%)  ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Vector Xi   ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓ 
Δ Electoral Support ICs Bye-1952 (%)    ✓     ✓     ✓ 
Δ Total Turnout Bye-1952 (%)    ✓     ✓     ✓ 
Notes: Vector Xi includes the variables: Population (log), Altitude, and Distance from Largest City; Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and include a constant; t-statistics 
in parentheses; ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively. 
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The most severe identification concern is that our estimates could capture pre-existing 
trends in high-dosage communities. To rule this out, we check whether the proportion of 
women in the electorate can explain changes in party vote shares before the reform (when 
it should not). Specifically, we run the same regression set-up as in Table 6, but, instead of 
controlling for the change in party vote shares between 1951 and 1952 
(𝛥 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖1952−1951), we now use it as the dependent variable. Table 7 reports 
the estimates. Once additional controls are included, none of the placebo regressions return 
large and statistically significant estimates, confirming that partisan support was not 
trending differently in communities most affected by the reform. 
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Table 7: Placebo regressions for the effect of women’s suffrage on change in electoral support (full sample) 
Dependent Variable (DV): Δ Electoral Support 1952-1951 (%) 
 Right  Left  Center-Liberal 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
PANEL I 
Thessaloniki Bye2 
           
Women in Electorate Bye (%) 0.23** 0.06 -0.02 
 
0.08 0.17 0.23 
 
-0.31** -0.23 -0.21 
 
(2.52) (0.64) (0.17) 
 
(0.75) (1.36) (1.50) 
 
(2.24) (1.60) (1.34) 
Obs. 108 108 108 
 
108 108 108 
 
108 108 108 
R2 0.05 0.22 0.24 
 
0.01 0.03 0.04 
 
0.05 0.12 0.12 
            
PANEL II 
Rest Constituencies 
           
Women in Electorate Bye (%) 0.09 0.09 0.10 
 
0.03 0.03 0.04 
 
-0.06 -0.07 -0.09 
 
(0.92) (0.99) (0.95) 
 
(0.77) (0.67) (0.85) 
 
(0.64) (0.74) (0.82) 
Obs. 253 253 253 
 
253 253 253 
 
253 253 253 
R2 0.19 0.19 0.21 
 
0.11 0.11 0.11 
 
0.41 0.42 0.44 
            
Controls            
Constituency FEs ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Vector Xi  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ 
Δ Electoral Support ICs Bye-1952 (%)   ✓    ✓    ✓ 
Δ Total Turnout Bye-1952 (%)   ✓    ✓    ✓ 
Notes: Vector Xi includes the variables: Population (log), Altitude, and Distance from Largest City; Regressions are estimated using robust 
standard errors and include a constant; t-statistics in parentheses; ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level 
respectively. 
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4.3 The role of economically inactive women 
We now turn to examine whether women’s participation in the labour market mediated the 
extent to which they voted more conservatively compared to men. To do so, we pool 
together the communities in Thessaloniki and Rest Prefectures, and augment the regression 
specifications of Table 6 with the proportion of economically inactive women 
(𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖) and its interaction with the treatment variable, as in Eq. 
(2). The results, displayed in Table 8, provide empirical validity to Hypothesis 2: the 
interaction term enters the regressions with the expected sign (positive for right parties and 
negative for center-liberal parties) and is highly statistically significant throughout. This 
suggests that support gains for right parties at the expense of center-liberal parties (caused 
by the suffrage reform) were stronger in communities with higher levels of economically 
inactive women. 
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Table 8: The interactive relationship with economically inactive women (full sample) 
Dependent Variable (DV): Δ Electoral Support Bye-1952 (%) 
 Right  Left  Center-Liberal 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
All Constituencies               
Women in Electorate Bye (%) -0.35* -0.29 -0.21 -0.26 
 
0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.00 
 
0.42** 0.34* 0.36* 0.27 
 
(1.89) (1.51) (1.09) (1.27) 
 
(0.17) (0.38) (0.45) (0.05) 
 
(2.21) (1.71) (1.75) (1.31) 
Economically Inactive Women (%) -0.52*** -0.50*** -0.35** -0.39** 
 
0.10 0.11 0.01 0.02 
 
0.47*** 0.45*** 0.44** 0.39** 
 
(3.29) (3.11) (2.08) (2.29) 
 
(1.64) (1.57) (0.17) (0.26) 
 
(2.99) (2.82) (2.50) (2.29) 
Interaction Term 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01** 
 
-0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
-0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01** 
 
(2.97) (2.80) (2.16) (2.34) 
 
(0.58) (0.58) (0.44) (0.33) 
 
(3.09) (2.87) (2.72) (2.53) 
Obs. 385 361 361 361 
 
385 361 361 361 
 
385 361 361 361 
R2 0.52 0.55 0.56 0.58 
 
0.39 0.41 0.42 0.43 
 
0.54 0.58 0.59 0.61 
               
Controls               
Constituency Fes ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Lagged DV 1952-1951 (%)  ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Vector Xi   ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓ 
Δ Electoral Support ICs Bye-1952 (%)    ✓     ✓     ✓ 
Δ Total Turnout Bye-1952 (%)    ✓     ✓     ✓ 
Notes: ‘Interaction Term’ is the product of the variables ‘Women in Electorate Bye (%)’ and ‘Economically Inactive Women (%)’; Vector Xi includes the variables: Population (log), Altitude, and 
Distance from Largest City; Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and include a constant; t-statistics in parentheses; ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence 
level respectively. 
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To explore more thoroughly the conditionality of the gender voting gap upon the proportion 
of economically inactive women, we calculate the margins of the variable 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝐵𝑦𝑒 (based on estimates from the regressions in columns (4), (8) and 
(12) of Table 8) and plot them over the respective values of the variable 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖. As shown in Figure 2, women’s enfranchisement 
affected partisan outcomes only when women were predominantly out of the labour force. 
While the treatment variable exerts a positive (negative) effect on the electoral support for 
right (center-liberal) parties at high levels of ‘inactiveness’, this effect appears to be 
reversed and statistically insignificant at low levels of ‘inactiveness’. In particular, the 
suffrage-induced change in the vote shares of the two party blocks (as implied by the 
traditional gender voting gap thesis) becomes statistically significant when the proportion of 
economically inactive women takes a value of about 50%, and the magnitude of this change 
becomes very large when the variable reaches values as high as 90%. For instance, when we 
evaluate the suffrage effects at the maximum value of ‘inactiveness’ (94%), a one-standard 
deviation increase in the proportion of women in the electorate leads to an increase in the 
vote share of right parties by 3.8 percentage points and a decrease in the vote share of 
center-liberal parties by 4.1 percentage points. 
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Figure 2: Conditional effects of women in electorate for All Prefectures 
 
Notes: This graph shows the conditional effects of women’s suffrage on the change in electoral support for right, left and center-liberal parties at different values of economically inactive women in All 
Prefectures; The conditional effects are calculated based on the specifications (4), (8) and (12) of Table 8; All other covariates are held constant at their means; Dashed lines signify 90% confidence 
intervals; Rug plot at horizontal axis illustrates distribution of economically inactive women in All Prefectures; Red horizontal line marks marginal effect of 0. 
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As noted in Section 3.1, the communities in Rest Prefectures were characterized by a much 
lower, on average, proportion of economically inactive women than those in Thessaloniki. 
When this structural difference and the findings of the previous two paragraphs are viewed 
together, a new question emerges: is the absence of a gender voting gap in Rest Prefectures 
driven by relatively low levels of economic inactiveness among women? To answer this 
question, we test whether the effects reported in Table 6 for Thessaloniki and Rest 
Prefectures prevail regardless of what level of labour market participation is imposed on the 
female population. To this end, we calculate and plot the conditional effects of Figure 2 
separately for Thessaloniki and Rest Prefectures (see Figures 3 and 4). Two regularities stand 
out. First, the proportion of economically inactive women influences the size and statistical 
significance of the gender voting gap in both community groups. The main difference is that, 
in Thessaloniki, the suffrage effect on party vote shares becomes statistically insignificant at 
very low levels of ‘inactiveness’, while in Rest Prefectures, it reaches statistical significance 
only at very high levels of ‘inactiveness’. Second, the distribution of economically inactive 
women in Thessaloniki is highly skewed to the left with the mean value of 64% 
corresponding to statistically significant effects, whereas the distribution of economically 
inactive women in Rest Prefectures is highly skewed to the right with the mean value of 42% 
corresponding to statistically insignificant effects. Based on these regularities, we can safely 
conclude that the pro-right shift caused by the suffrage was not only a phenomenon of 
communities in Thessaloniki; it could also be identified in other communities as long as they 
had a sufficiently high level of economically inactive women. 
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Figure 3: Conditional effects of women in electorate for Thessaloniki 
 
Notes: This graph shows the conditional effects of women’s suffrage on the change in electoral support for right, left and center-liberal parties at different values of economically inactive women in 
Thessaloniki; The conditional effects are calculated based on the specifications (4), (8) and (12) of Table 8; All other covariates are held constant at their means; Dashed lines signify 90% confidence 
intervals; Rug plot at horizontal axis illustrates distribution of economically inactive women in Thessaloniki; Red horizontal line marks marginal effect of 0. 
 
 
 
 
34 
Figure 4: Conditional effects of women in electorate for Rest Prefectures 
 
Notes: This graph shows the conditional effects of women’s suffrage on the change in electoral support for right, left and center-liberal parties at different values of economically inactive women in Rest 
Prefectures; The conditional effects are calculated based on the specifications (4), (8) and (12) of Table 8; All other covariates are held constant at their means; Dashed lines signify 90% confidence 
intervals; Rug plot at horizontal axis illustrates distribution of economically inactive women in Rest Prefectures; Red horizontal line marks marginal effect of 0. 
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As before, we perform placebo tests to ensure that the results of this section are not 
influenced by pre-existing trends. More precisely, we replace the dependent variable with 
its lagged value (𝛥 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖1952−1951) and run the same regression set-up as in 
Table 8, and then use the estimates (from the specifications with the full list of controls) to 
calculate the conditional effects. The results are shown in Table 9 and Figure 5. Once again, 
we reject the violation of the parallel trend assumption: all effects are small and far from 
conventional levels of statistical significance. 
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 Table 9: Placebo regressions for the interactive relationship with economically inactive women (full sample) 
Dependent Variable (DV) Δ Electoral Support 1952-1951 (%) 
 Right  Left  Center-Liberal 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
All Constituencies            
Women in Electorate Bye (%) 0.11 0.19 0.17 
 
-0.00 -0.03 -0.00 
 
-0.12 -0.16 -0.12 
 
(0.61) (1.06) (0.90) 
 
(0.01) (0.37) (0.02) 
 
(0.59) (0.80) (0.59) 
Economically Inactive Women (%) -0.02 0.09 0.10 
 
-0.05 -0.10 -0.09 
 
0.04 -0.01 0.02 
 
(0.12) (0.69) (0.76) 
 
(0.72) (1.32) (1.24) 
 
(0.23) (0.06) (0.13) 
Interaction Term -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.02) (0.64) (0.67) 
 
(0.44) (0.91) (0.80) 
 
(0.16) (0.39) (0.23) 
Obs. 361 361 361 
 
361 361 361 
 
361 361 361 
R2 0.18 0.19 0.20 
 
0.08 0.08 0.09 
 
0.37 0.37 0.39 
            
Controls            
Constituency FEs ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Vector Xi  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ 
Δ Electoral Support ICs Bye-1952 (%)   ✓    ✓    ✓ 
Δ Total Turnout Bye-1952 (%)   ✓    ✓    ✓ 
Notes: ‘Interaction Term’ is the product of the variables ‘Women in Electorate Bye (%)’ and ‘Economically Inactive Women (%)’; Vector Xi 
includes the variables: Population (log), Altitude, and Distance from Largest City; Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and 
include a constant; t-statistics in parentheses; ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively. 
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Figure 5: Placebo conditional effects of women in electorate for All Prefectures 
 
Notes: This graph shows the placebo conditional effects of women’s suffrage on the change in electoral support for right, left and center-liberal parties at different values of economically inactive women 
in All Prefectures; The conditional effects are calculated based on the specifications (3), (6) and (9) of Table 9; All other covariates are held constant at their means; Dashed lines signify 90% confidence 
intervals; Rug plot at horizontal axis illustrates distribution of economically inactive women in All Prefectures; Red horizontal line marks marginal effect of 0. 
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4.4 Robustness tests 
One important concern is that the different results for Thessaloniki and Rest Prefectures, as 
well as the conditionality of the gender voting gap upon the proportion of economically 
inactive women, are driven by differences in the level of economic development across 
communities. To address this concern, we exclude all communities defined as ‘urban’ in the 
censuses (32 in Thessaloniki and 4 in Rest Prefectures) and re-estimate the unconditional 
and conditional effects of Table 6 and Figure 2. Overall, we find evidence that validates the 
findings of the previous sections: the estimates retain their sign and statistical significance, 
even though they are somewhat smaller in magnitude due to exclusion of a large number of 
communities in Thessaloniki (see Table 10 and Figure 6). To provide further support that the 
level of economic inactiveness among women is what determines the size and significance 
of the gender voting gap – even in the more rural communities – we replace the variable 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖 in Eq. (2) with a proxy for economic development based 
on the 1961 census; namely, the proportion of households in community i with access to 
electricity (𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖). Excluding the urban communities as in Figure 6, but now 
calculating the margins of the treatment variable over the respective values of the 
‘electricity access’ variable (instead of the ‘inactiveness’ variable) renders insignificant 
results (see Figure 7). 
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Table 10: Robustness tests for results in Table 6 -- without urban communities 
Dependent Variable (DV): Δ Electoral Support Bye-1952 (%) 
 Right  Left  Center-Liberal 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
PANEL I 
Thessaloniki Bye2 
              
Women in Electorate Bye (%) 0.25* 0.36*** 0.30** 0.31** 
 
-0.07 -0.08 -0.15 -0.19 
 
-0.16 -0.26* -0.12 -0.12 
 
(1.76) (2.89) (2.47) (2.40) 
 
(0.57) (0.59) (1.20) (1.35) 
 
(1.08) (1.85) (0.90) (0.75) 
Obs. 79 76 76 76 
 
79 76 76 76 
 
79 76 76 76 
R2 0.04 0.14 0.29 0.51 
 
0.00 0.02 0.28 0.29 
 
0.01 0.10 0.30 0.31 
               
PANEL II 
Rest Constituencies 
              
Women in Electorate Bye (%) 0.02    0.06    0.05    0.08    
 
-0.00    0.01    0.01    0.02    
 
0.01    -0.03    -0.03    -0.08    
 
(0.20)    (0.56)    (0.54)    (0.69)    
 
(0.06)    (0.39)    (0.33)    (0.49)    
 
(0.12)    (0.32)    (0.27)    (0.79)    
Obs. 270    249    249    249    
 
270    249    249    249    
 
270    249    249    249    
R2 0.52    0.56    0.56    0.57    
 
0.22    0.28    0.29    0.29    
 
0.56    0.61    0.61    0.64    
               
Controls               
Constituency Fes ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Lagged DV 1952-1951 (%)  ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Vector Xi   ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓ 
Δ Electoral Support ICs Bye-1952 (%)    ✓     ✓     ✓ 
Δ Total Turnout Bye-1952 (%)    ✓     ✓     ✓ 
Notes: Vector Xi includes the variables: Population (log), Altitude, and Distance from Largest City; Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and include a 
constant; t-statistics in parentheses; Regressions exclude all communities defined as ‘urban’ in the censuses (36 in total); ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 
10% confidence level respectively. 
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Figure 6: Robustness tests for results in Figure 2 - without urban communities 
 
Notes: This graph shows the conditional effects of women’s suffrage on the change in electoral support for right, left and center-liberal parties at different values of economically inactive women in All 
Prefectures; The conditional effects are calculated based on the specifications (4), (8) and (12) of Table 8; Regressions exclude all communities defined as ‘urban’ in the censuses (36 in total); All other 
covariates are held constant at their means; Dashed lines signify 90% confidence intervals; Rug plot at horizontal axis illustrates distribution of economically inactive women in All Prefectures; Red 
horizontal line marks marginal effect of 0. 
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Figure 7: Robustness tests for results in Figure 2 – without urban communities; interactive relationship with electricity access (%) 
 
Notes: This graph shows the conditional effects of women’s suffrage on the change in electoral support for right, left and center-liberal parties at different values of electricity access in All Prefectures; 
The conditional effects are calculated based on the specifications (4), (8) and (12) of Table 8; Regressions exclude all communities defined as ‘urban’ in the censuses (36 in total); All other covariates are 
held constant at their means; Dashed lines signify 90% confidence intervals; Rug plot at horizontal axis illustrates distribution of electricity access in All Prefectures; Red horizontal line marks marginal 
effect of 0. 
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In Appendix 3, Tables B4-B6 and Figures B2-B7, we present additional robustness checks. 
First, we check whether our results hold when we introduce fixed effects at a finer 
administrative level (province). Second, we test whether our results persist when we use the 
vote shares of the largest party/parties of each political ideology to construct our 
dependent variable. Third, we exclude the two prefectures (Grevena and Rethymno) where 
the by-elections took place because of cancellation of the 1952 election results, rather than 
the death of an elected MP. This allows us to eliminate any remaining endogeneity concerns 
stemming from politicians being able to influence the timing of elections. Fourth, to address 
the possibility of measurement errors and biases arising from the fact that the ‘inactiveness’ 
variable is based on information from the 1961 census, we exclude communities with large 
population changes between 1951 and 1961. Fifth, to make sure that our results are not 
influenced by other characteristics of the female population, we add to the regressions two 
additional 1961 variables; namely, the proportion of non-married women and the 
proportion of illiterate women in each community. Finally, to overcome concerns that the 
direction of effects is determined by the level of ‘inactiveness’ of the total population rather 
than that of women, we re-define the ‘inactiveness’ variable as the gap between the 
proportion of economically inactive women and the proportion of economically inactive 
men. Additional discussions of these tests are provided in Appendix 2. All in all, the 
estimates obtained from these tests support the key findings of the paper: a suffrage-
induced shift in the support for right parties in Thessaloniki (combined with withdrawal of 
support for center-liberal parties) and a strong dependence of the gender voting gap on the 
proportion of economically inactive women. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The paper at hand seeks to identify the causal relationship between women’s 
enfranchisement and party vote shares in Greece in the early 1950s. The case of Greece is 
interesting – both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view – for a number of 
reasons. First, women’s enfranchisement took place in Greece during a period that the 
economy was still agrarian especially in the countryside. This allows us to investigate the 
existence of early “gender voting gap” during the first phases of economic development 
(i.e., as an economy moves away from agriculture) and moreover to detect potential 
differences in the patterns of voting behaviour between the women of the urban centres – 
where an infant industry had started to be developed – and those who were living in rural 
areas where agriculture was still the dominant activity.  
Second, in Greece, women enfranchisement came as a result of pressures from the United 
Nations, and it was never supported rigorously by any of the major domestic political actors. 
This is because in the early 1950s the Greek civil war (1946-1949) had just finished and all of 
the major Greek political parties were afraid that such a radical reform – that would lead to 
the doubling of the registered voters – might have unintended consequences concerning 
the empowerment of the communist party. Obviously, this stylized fact (i.e. that 
enfranchisement came as a result of international pressures) is an important characteristic 
that mitigates potential reverse causality concerns arising from the possibility of strategic 
enfranchisement by the elected leaders. In addition, in Greece, women went to the polls for 
the first time in seven specific electoral prefectures where by-elections took place in 1953 
and 1954, aiming to fill seats that became vacant due to the death of an elected deputy or 
the cancellation of the 1952 election result by the electoral court. This characteristic also to 
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alleviate concerns regarding potential endogenous effects arising from knowing or being 
able to influence the timing of elections.  
Empirical analysis builds upon a unique community-level dataset of 385 communities 
located in seven prefectures in which by-elections were held in 1953 and 1954. Our 
identification strategy exploits the uneven and exogenous spatial variation in the 
concentration of eligible (registered) women voters as a measure of the received “dosage” 
of the franchise reform in different communities, in a difference-in-differences design that 
holds unobserved local characteristics fixed. Obtained empirical findings provides evidence 
of a “traditional gender voting gap” in the urban area of Thessaloniki, while it fails to 
establish gender voting gap in the other six, predominantly rural, prefectures of our sample. 
Furthermore, our analysis suggests that the size and significance of a gender voting gap is 
driven by differences in the ratio of female labor force inactivity. Interestingly, the pro-right 
shift caused by the suffrage can also be observed in communities outside Thessaloniki as 
long as they had a sufficiently high level of economically inactive women. Relying on the 
economic bargaining models of the family, we interpret our empirical findings along the 
following lines.  In an economic environment characterized by limited demand for female 
labour force participation, women support more vigorously the sanctity and the strength of 
family values and tend to vote more conservatively compared to men.  
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Appendix 1: A brief history of female suffrage in Greece 
 
A1 The early feminist movement and the local elections of 1934 
During the first decades after its independence in 1833, Greece’s political regime was a 
monarchy under the reign of King Otto. A series of events that started in 1862 led to the 
ascension of King George I to the Greek throne in 1863 (see Alivizatos, 2011). The following 
year an important constitutional reform took place: establishing a “democracy under a King” 
with universal suffrage for all males 21 years old and over. Although the Greek constitution 
of 1864 extended the voting rights to the whole male population (without property 
restrictions or literacy requirements), it abstained from providing political voting rights to 
females. The exclusion of women from the political procedures was taken as granted by all 
the parties from all over the political spectrum during that period (see Samiou, 2013).37  
On 8 March 1887, Kallirhoe Parren, a Greek journalist and writer, founded a newspaper 
titled “Women’s Journal” (Ephimeris ton Kirion) that run entirely by women and was aiming 
to inform the Greek society for issues related to gender discrimination. For many scholars 
that was the formal date of the beginning of the feminist movement in Greece (see, e.g., 
Avdela and Psara, 1985; Varika, 1987). It must be noted that the basic priorities of that early 
feminist movement were the rights of women on: (i) education and (ii) wage labour. The 
issue of equal political rights was considered as fairly radical during that period and most of 
the feminists – including Kallirhoe Parren – decided to follow a strategy of downgrading the 
demand for extension of the suffrage on females in order to achieve a series of other 
political goals at first (see, e.g., Varika, 1987; Samiou, 2013).38 
This situation started to change gradually after the end of WWI. During that period 
Eleftherios Venizelos and Dimitrios Gounaris, the leaders of the two major parties in Greece, 
made political statements about the need of ensuring equal political rights between women 
and men in Greece. These political views were affected by a series of affairs that took place 
in the international political market during the interwar period, and especially the first wave 
of women enfranchisement that ensured “full” and “active” voting rights to women in about 
40 different countries (see Teele, 2018a for more details on this). After a decade of harsh 
disagreements that took place within major political parties, the government of liberal 
leader Eleftherios Venizelos extended the voting rights to the female population on 5 
February 1930. However, the relevant law provided voting rights solely for local elections 
and by imposing strict age and literacy requirements. More precisely, the electorate was 
restricted to all literate women that were above the age of 30. It must be noted that these 
literacy requirements as well as a large number of bureaucratic barriers – mostly related to 
electoral registration – restricted substantially the number of eligible women voters in the 
local elections of 1934. As a result, a total of 10,571 women went on the polls whereas the 
 
37 We note that until the end of the 1920s only five countries had provided “full” (i.e., more than half of all 
adults women) and “active” (i.e. right to vote rather than the right to stand in office) suffrage to women. The 
territory of Wyoming (1869), New Zealand, Chile, Finland and Australia. 
38 Although the first volumes of the “Women’s Journal” were highly supportive of female suffrage, the editorial 
board soon realized that promoting the demand of equal political rights between men and women had 
generated wide disagreements - even within the female population- that could harm the rest political goals of 
the feminist movement. Therefore, they decided strategically to postpone for later the demand of equal 
political rights.  
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adult female population in Greece during that period was more than 2.5 million (see, e.g., 
Samiou, 2013). 
 
A2 The Greek political system in the era of suffrage and the local elections of 
1951 
The subsequent dictatorships of George Kondylis (1935) and Ioannis Metaxas (1936-1941) 
and in turn the German Occupation (1941-1944) and the Greek civil war (1946-1949) 
blocked for more than a decade any progress concerning the issue of female 
enfranchisement in Greece. Then, on 22 April 1949 the government of Themistoklis Sofoulis  
– a coalition government of the right-wing People’s Party (Laikon Komma) and the centre-
liberal, Liberal Party (Komma Fileleftheron) – took the initiative to introduce a Bill that 
provided full voting rights for local elections (i.e. without literacy requirements) to all 
women 25 years old and over. This – almost sudden – political development came mostly as 
a result of political directives from the United Nations. A month ago, the United Nations’ 
meeting that took place in Beirut decided that all members-states were obliged to extend 
voting rights to women within the next twelve months. Given that Greece was planning to 
join the Security Council of the United Nations, it had to take specific steps that would 
ensure political equality between men and women (see, e.g., Samiou, 2013). 
Since none of the major political parties in Greece was actually in favour of women 
enfranchisement, the Bill was not debated in the parliament and remained in abeyance for 
the next two years. Then, on March of 1951, the coalition government of Nikolaos Plastiras 
– a coalition government of the two centre-liberal parties (i.e. National Progressive Center 
Union (Ethniki Poodeytiki Parataxis Kentrou) and the Liberal Party (Komma Fileleftheron)) 
introduced the Bill for debate in the parliament. In that debate, it became clear the 
existence of harsh disagreements between deputies both across and within parties. The 
right-wing People’s Party (Laikon Komma) – that was the largest party during that period – 
voted massively against women enfranchisement whereas two of the major centre-liberal 
parties, the Liberal Party (Komma Fileleftheron) and the Georgios Papandreou Party 
(Komma Georgiou Papandreou) were split with some of their deputies voting in favour of 
the Bill and others deciding to abstain from the process.39  The only two parties that voted 
massively in favour of the Bill were the National Progressive Center Union (Ethniki 
Poodeytiki Parataxis Kentrou) of Nikolaos Plastiras – the third major center-liberal party of 
that period – and the left-wing Democratic Alignment (Dimkratiki Parataxis) of Alexandros 
Svolos. As a consequence, the Bill enacted as Law on 31 March 1951 with the votes of the 
left-wing and some center-liberal deputies (see Samiou, 2013 for more details on this). 
In the local elections that took place on 15 April 1951, a total of 734,750 women went to the 
polls (i.e., about 82%). The major conclusion driven from the electoral results was that 
females voted in a more conservative way than it was generally expected and for sure more 
conservatively compared to males. According to Nikolakopoulos (2001), in the municipality 
of Athens Konstantinos Kotzias – who was the candidate supported by the right-wing 
People’s Party – received much higher vote shares in women’s polling stations relative to 
those of men.40 The stylized fact that women’s votes were mainly directed to right-wing and 
centre-liberal parties was also verified by a relevant report sent from the Greek government 
 
39 The abstention rate of the deputies from the Liberal Party (Komma Fileleftheron) and the Georgios 
Papandreou Party (Komma George Papandreou) reached the level of 59% in that parliament debate.  
40 More precisely, Konstantinos Kotzias received 70.4% in women polling stations and 55.2% in the 
corresponding male polling stations (see Nikolakopoulos, 2001 for more details on this). 
 
 
50 
to the United Nations just after the local elections. In that report it was noted that: “[...] 
Female population had shown strong national consciousness and political maturity”.  
 
A3 The parliamentary elections of 1952 
The results of the local election, combined with the persistent and increased pressures from 
the United Nations to ensure political equality between men and women, led to an 
acceleration of the legislative procedures aiming to provide voting rights to women in 
national elections. To this end, on 4 February 1952 the government of Nikolaos Plastiras 
introduced a new Bill of full female enfranchisement for debate in the parliament. The 
debate that lasted for months made obvious that the harsh disagreements of the past – 
between different parties but also between different deputies within the same party – had 
disappeared. Parties from all over the political spectrum were now in agreement that it was 
the time to provide full voting rights to all adult women. As a result, on 30 May 1952, the Bill 
enacted as law and voting rights in parliamentary elections were extended to all adult 
women. 
At that point, the political parties and the electorate in Greece believed that women would 
participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections that had been arranged for 16 
November 1952. However, the Ministry of Interior refuted that option by stating that it was 
technically impossible to update the electoral registers in a time period of less than six 
months. Women did not participate in the parliamentary elections of 1952, though they 
voted in seven special elections between 1953 and 1954 that took place in order to fill seats 
that became vacant due to the death of an elected deputy or the cancellation of the 1952 
election result by the electoral court. However, they participated in the whole Greek 
territory in the next parliamentary elections that were held on 19 February 1956 (see 
Samiou, 2013). 
 
 
Appendix 2: Robustness tests 
 
In this appendix, we present the additional analyses discussed in the last paragraph of 
Section 4.4, aiming at providing further support to the main findings of this paper.  
First, we use fixed effects at a finer administrative level. The baseline models in the main 
text include prefecture fixed effects capturing prefecture-specific shocks. As a robustness 
check, we experiment by replacing the prefecture fixed effects with province fixed effects – 
with each prefecture having, on average, three provinces. Our results are not influenced by 
this exercise (see Table B4 and Figure B2). 
Second, we use a different party classification to construct our dependent variable. So far, 
we have classified all parties in Greece into right, left or center-liberal. However, taking into 
account only the largest party/parties of each political colour (Greek Rally as ‘right’, National 
Progressive Center Union and Liberal Party as ‘center-liberal’ and United Democratic Left as 
‘left’) produces remarkably consistent results (see Table B5 and Figure B3). 
Third, we restrict our sample only to cases that by-elections took place as a result of death 
of an elected MP. The reason for holding the 1953/54 by-elections in the seven studied 
prefectures was either the death of an elected MP or the cancellation of the 1952 election 
result by the electoral court. Arguably, the timing of the elections in the latter case is not as 
exogenous as in the former case. We thus explore whether our results persist when we 
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exclude the two prefectures (Grevena and Rethymno) with ‘cancellation’ as the reason for 
the by-elections. As shown in Table B6 and Figure B4, the unconditional and conditional 
effects are very similar with those reported in Table 6 and Figure 2. 
Fourth, we check the sensitivity of our conditional effects to dropping communities. Our 
variable for economically inactive women is based on information from the 1961 census. To 
address the possibility of measurement errors and biases arising from using a census that 
was carried out a few years later than the 1953/54 by-elections, we check robustness to 
excluding communities with large population changes between the years 1951 and 1961; 
that is, those with a population growth rate between the two years of less than -25% or 
more than 25% (66 in total). The resulting estimates do not change the inferences drawn 
from earlier findings (see Figure B5).  
Fifth, we test whether our conditional effects are sensitive to the inclusion of extra controls. 
To do so, we augment our model with two variables capturing other characteristics of the 
female population which may be correlated with the outcome of interest or the treatment 
variable; namely, the proportion of non-married women and the proportion of illiterate 
women in each community. The conditionality upon the proportion of economically inactive 
women persists when we control for these two variables (see Figure B6).  
Finally, we check whether our conditional effects are driven by the level of ‘inactiveness’ of 
the total population in each community rather than that of women. To this end, we re-
define the ‘inactiveness’ variable as the difference between the proportion of economically 
inactive women and the proportion of economically inactive men, as captured by the term 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖 . Our estimates based on this alternative definition produce 
very similar patterns as in Figure 2 and leave our conclusions unchanged (see Figure B7).  
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Appendix 3 
 
 
Table B1a: Descriptive statistics 
  Thessaloniki  
  Obs Mean SD Min Max  
PANEL I        
Variables in levels        
Women in Electorate Bye (%)  111 46.2 6.6 24.8 59.2  
Men’s Turnout Bye (%)  49 71.6 5.7 60.2 82.1  
Women’s Electoral Support Right Bye (%)  49 36.8 10.7 7.3 57.1  
Women’s Electoral Support Left Bye (%)  49 29.9 11.9 6.6 52.4  
Women’s Electoral Support Center-Liberal Bye (%)  49 17.4 6.7 1.4 26.6  
Women’s Turnout Bye (%)  49 67.2 17.5 26.6 86.0  
        
PANEL II        
Variables in changes        
Δ Men’s Turnout Bye-1952 (%)  49 -10.2 4.1 -23.5 2.0  
Δ Men’s Registration Bye-1952  49 -20.9 145.7 -756.0 243.0  
Notes: The table reports additional regression variables (not reported in Table 2) based on the first by-election  
of Thessaloniki, or the difference between the first by-election and the 1952 election.  
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Table B1b: Descriptive statistics 
 All Prefectures   Thessaloniki  Rest Prefectures 
 Obs Mean SD Min Max  Obs Mean SD Min Max  Obs Mean SD Min Max 
PANEL I                  
Variables in levels                  
Unmarried Women (%) 385 44.8 5.0 24.8 59.9  111 46.1 4.8 24.8 51.7  274 44.3 5.1 29.9 59.9 
Illiterate Women (%) 385 31.8 9.9 12.5 63.9  111 23.2 7.4 12.5 38.4  274 35.3 8.5 14.6 63.9 
Economically Inactive Gap (%) 385 30.3 18.3 -7.4 88.9 
 
111 42.4 16.1 5.3 68.6 
 
274 25.4 16.8 -7.4 88.9 
                  
PANEL II                  
Variables in changes                  
Δ Electoral Support Right Bye-1952 (%) (main party) 385 5.2 15.9 -32.0 52.5  111 -0.1 8.5 -21.1 22.9  274 7.3 17.6 -32.0 52.5 
Δ Electoral Support Left Bye-1952 (%) (main party) 385 2.0 6.8 -25.5 38.8  111 7.6 8.1 -25.5 38.8  274 -0.3 4.6 -20.9 23.6 
Δ Electoral Support Center-Liberal Bye-1952 (%)(main party) 385 -2.0 19.6 -51.7 87.3  111 -9.9 8.0 -41.8 18.1  274 1.3 21.9 -51.7 87.3 
Δ Electoral Support Right 1952-1951 (%) (main party) 361 15.6 12.6 -22.1 90.7  108 14.9 8.4 -11.9 41.6  253 16.0 14.0 -22.1 90.7 
Δ Electoral Support Left 1952-1951 (%) (main party) 361 0.2 6.0 -44.3 30.5  108 -0.6 7.7 -44.3 19.4  253 0.5 5.1 -27.2 30.5 
Δ Electoral Support Center-Liberal 1952-1951 (%)(main party) 361 -10.8 19.2 -97.5 28.6  108 -3.9 8.4 -26.4 26.2  253 -13.7 21.7 -97.5 28.6 
Δ Electoral Support ICs Bye-1952 (%) (main party) 385 -5.1 18.7 -99.7 26.7  111 2.4 3.1 -0.2 25.7  274 -8.2 21.3 -99.7 26.7 
Population growth 1961-1951 (%) 385 4.5 25.4 -54.2 213.1  111 10.8 32.1 -54.2 213.1  274 1.9 21.6 -39.4 184.2 
Notes: The table reports the additional regression variables employed in the robustness checks of Appendix 2. 
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Table B2: Women in electorate and their share of turnout (restricted sample) 
Dependent Variable (DV): Women’s Share of Turnout Bye (%) 
 Thessaloniki Bye2  Rest Constituencies 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Women in Electorate Bye (%) 0.19 0.42***  0.50*** 0.48*** 
 (1.31) (2.72)  (3.27) (2.50) 
Obs. 44 44  34 34 
R2 0.04 0.48  0.14 0.22 
      
Communities NM NM  NM NM 
      
Controls      
Vector Xi  ✓   ✓ 
Notes: ‘NM’ (no mixed-gender) excludes communities with at least one mixed-gender polling 
station; Vector Xi includes the variables: Population (log), Altitude, and Distance from Largest City; 
Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and include a constant; t-statistics in 
parentheses; ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively. 
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Table B3: The effect of women’s suffrage and the municipality of Thessaloniki (restricted sample) 
Dependent Variable (DV): Δ Electoral Support Bye-1952 (%) 
 Right  Left  Center-Liberal 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Women in Electorate Bye (%) 0.18 0.53***  -0.35 -0.59  0.17 0.09 
 (0.68) (3.16)  (0.85) (1.49)  (0.70) (0.28) 
Municipality of Thessaloniki -16.58 1.45  -23.42 -31.37  38.20*** 27.79 
 (1.22) (0.16)  (1.19) (1.64)  (2.71) (1.56) 
Interaction term 0.27 -0.01  0.58 0.64  -0.85*** -0.60 
 (0.93) (0.07)  (1.38) (1.58)  (2.85) (1.57) 
         
Obs. 44 43  44 43  44 43 
R2 0.50 0.77  0.16 0.48  0.23 0.47 
         
Communities NM NM  NM NM  NM NM 
         
Controls         
Lagged DV 1952-1951 (%)  ✓   ✓   ✓ 
Δ Men’s Registration Bye-1952  ✓   ✓   ✓ 
Vector Xi  ✓   ✓   ✓ 
Δ Electoral Support ICs Bye-1952 (%)  ✓   ✓   ✓ 
Δ Total Turnout Bye-1952 (%)  ✓   ✓   ✓ 
Notes: ‘Interaction Term’ is the product of the variables ‘Women in Electorate Bye (%)’ and ‘Municipality of Thessaloniki’; ‘NM’ 
(no mixed-gender) excludes communities with at least one mixed-gender polling station; Vector Xi includes the variables: Population 
(log), Altitude, and Distance from Largest City; Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and include a constant; t-
statistics in parentheses; ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively. 
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Table B4: Robustness tests for results in Table 6 -- controlling for province FEs 
Dependent Variable (DV): Δ Electoral Support Bye-1952 (%) 
 Right  Left  Center-Liberal 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
PANEL I 
Thessaloniki Bye2 
              
Women in Electorate Bye (%) 0.48*** 0.58*** 0.41*** 0.39*** 
 
-0.15 -0.15 -0.07 -0.11 
 
-0.27** -0.37*** -0.28** -0.28** 
 
(3.94) (4.92) (3.41) (3.36) 
 
(1.61) (1.27) (0.64) (1.07) 
 
(2.47) (2.95) (2.48) (2.09) 
Obs. 111 108 108 108 
 
111 108 108 108 
 
111 108 108 108 
R2 0.26 0.32 0.50 0.62 
 
0.12 0.14 0.33 0.35 
 
0.08 0.14 0.29 0.29 
               
PANEL II 
Rest Constituencies 
              
Women in Electorate Bye (%) -0.00    0.03    0.00    0.03    
 
0.01    0.03    0.02    0.02    
 
0.01    -0.04    -0.00    -0.05    
 
(0.01)    (0.33)    (0.01)    (0.28)    
 
(0.32)    (0.83)    (0.54)    (0.75)    
 
(0.15)    (0.48)    (0.03)    (0.46)    
Obs. 274 253 253 253 
 
274 253 253 253 
 
274 253 253 253 
R2 0.58 0.61 0.62 0.62 
 
0.31 0.37 0.38 0.38 
 
0.59 0.64 0.65 0.67 
               
Controls               
Province FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Lagged DV 1952-1951 (%)  ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Vector Xi   ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓ 
Δ Electoral Support ICs Bye-1952 (%)    ✓     ✓     ✓ 
Δ Total Turnout Bye-1952 (%)    ✓     ✓     ✓ 
Notes: Vector Xi includes the variables: Population (log), Altitude, and Distance from Largest City; Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and include a constant; t-statistics in 
parentheses; ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively. 
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Table B5: Robustness tests for results in Table 6 – using the main parties 
Dependent Variable (DV): Δ Electoral Support Bye-1952 (%) 
 Right  Left  Center-Liberal 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
PANEL I 
Thessaloniki Bye2 
              
Women in Electorate Bye (%) 0.53*** 0.64*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 
 
-0.22**  -0.23**  -0.07    -0.12    
 
-0.26**  -0.34*** -0.26**  -0.25*   
 
(4.18)    (4.98)    (3.78)    (3.43)    
 
(2.17)    (2.09)    (0.70)    (1.04)    
 
(2.61)    (3.12)    (2.26)    (1.83)    
Obs. 111    108    108    108    
 
111    108    108    108    
 
111    108    108    108    
R2 0.18    0.28    0.53    0.61    
 
0.04    0.06    0.32    0.34    
 
0.05    0.11    0.26    0.27    
               
PANEL II 
Rest Constituencies 
              
Women in Electorate Bye (%) 0.04    0.04    0.02    0.05    
 
-0.00    0.01    0.01    0.01    
 
0.05    0.01    0.04    -0.03    
 
(0.40)    (0.44)    (0.26)    (0.47)    
 
(0.12)    (0.35)    (0.31)    (0.47)    
 
(0.39)    (0.07)    (0.31)    (0.25)    
Obs. 274    253    253    253    
 
274    253    253    253    
 
274    253    253    253    
R2 0.52    0.58    0.59    0.60    
 
0.23    0.29    0.30    0.30    
 
0.41    0.55    0.55    0.57    
               
Controls               
Constituency FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Lagged DV 1952-1951 (%)  ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Vector Xi   ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓ 
Δ Electoral Support ICs Bye-1952 (%)    ✓     ✓     ✓ 
Δ Total Turnout Bye-1952 (%)    ✓     ✓     ✓ 
Notes: Vector Xi includes the variables: Population (log), Altitude, and Distance from Largest City; Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and include a constant; t-statistics in 
parentheses; The dependent variables are constructed using the vote shares of the largest party/parties of each political ideology; ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
confidence level respectively. 
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Table B6: Robustness tests for results in Table 6 – excluding constituencies with cancellation as the reason for the by-elections 
Dependent Variable (DV): Δ Electoral Support Bye-1952 (%) 
 Right  Left  Center-Liberal 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
PANEL I 
Thessaloniki Bye2 
              
Women in Electorate Bye (%) 0.53*** 0.62*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 
 
-0.22** -0.23** -0.07 -0.12 
 
-0.26** -0.38*** -0.27** -0.26* 
 
(4.18) (4.91) (3.79) (3.35) 
 
(2.17) (2.00) (0.68) (1.01) 
 
(2.61) (3.07) (2.39) (1.87) 
Obs. 111 108 108 108 
 
111 108 108 108 
 
111 108 108 108 
R2 0.18 0.25 0.47 0.61 
 
0.04 0.06 0.32 0.34 
 
0.05 0.12 0.27 0.28 
               
PANEL II 
Rest Constituencies 
              
Women in Electorate Bye (%) -0.05    0.02    -0.00    0.05    
 
-0.04    -0.02    -0.02    0.00    
 
0.08    -0.02    0.01    -0.05    
 
(0.47)    (0.13)    (0.04)    (0.41)    
 
(1.44)    (0.74)    (0.61)    (0.04)    
 
(0.74)    (0.12)    (0.08)    (0.38)    
Obs. 206    189    189    189    
 
206    189    189    189    
 
206    189    189    189    
R2 0.30    0.35    0.36    0.37    
 
0.23    0.26    0.27    0.28    
 
0.53    0.59    0.60    0.64    
               
Controls               
Constituency FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Lagged DV 1952-1951 (%)  ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Vector Xi   ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓ 
Δ Electoral Support ICs Bye-1952 (%)    ✓     ✓     ✓ 
Δ Total Turnout Bye-1952 (%)    ✓     ✓     ✓ 
Notes: Vector Xi includes the variables: Population (log), Altitude, and Distance from Largest City; Regressions are estimated using robust standard errors and include a constant; t-statistics in 
parentheses; Regressions exclude communities in the constituencies of Grevena and Rethymno; ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively. 
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Figure B1: Electoral results for the second by-election held in Thessaloniki on 24 
January 1954 
 
Notes: From the left to the right the Table reports the name of the polling station (i.e., Εκλογικά τμήματα), the number of 
registered voters (i.e., Εγγεγραμμένοι εκλογείς), the number of valid votes (i.e., Έγκυρα ψηφοδέλτια), and party votes (i.e., 
Ψηφοδέλτια του συνδυασμού). Source: Ministry of Interior. 
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Figure B2: Robustness tests for results in Figure 2 - controlling for province FEs
 
Notes: This graph shows the conditional effects of women’s suffrage on the change in electoral support for right, left and center-liberal parties at different values of economically inactive women in All 
Prefectures; The conditional effects are calculated based on the specifications (4), (8) and (12) of Table 8; Regressions include province fixed effects, instead of prefecture fixed effects; All other 
covariates are held constant at their means; Dashed lines signify 90% confidence intervals; Rug plot at horizontal axis illustrates distribution of economically inactive women in All Prefectures; Red 
horizontal line marks marginal effect of 0. 
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Figure B3: Robustness tests for results in Figure 2 - using the largest parties 
 
Notes: This graph shows the conditional effects of women’s suffrage on the change in electoral support for right, left and center-liberal parties at different values of economically inactive women in All 
Prefectures; The conditional effects are calculated based on the specifications (4), (8) and (12) of Table 8; The dependent variables are constructed using the vote shares of the largest party/parties of each 
political ideology; All other covariates are held constant at their means; Dashed lines signify 90% confidence intervals; Rug plot at horizontal axis illustrates distribution of economically inactive women 
in All Prefectures; Red horizontal line marks marginal effect of 0. 
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Figure B4: Robustness tests for results in Figure 2 - excluding prefectures with cancellation as the reason for the by-elections
 
Notes: This graph shows the conditional effects of women’s suffrage on the change in electoral support for right, left and center-liberal parties at different values of economically inactive women in All 
Prefectures; The conditional effects are calculated based on the specifications (4), (8) and (12) of Table 8; Regressions exclude communities in the prefectures of Grevena and Rethymno; All other 
covariates are held constant at their means; Dashed lines signify 90% confidence intervals; Rug plot at horizontal axis illustrates distribution of economically inactive women in All Prefectures; Red 
horizontal line marks marginal effect of 0. 
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Figure B5: Robustness tests for results in Figure 2 - excluding communities with large population changes between 1951 and 1961 
 
Notes: This graph shows the conditional effects of women’s suffrage on the change in electoral support for right, left and center-liberal parties at different values of economically inactive women in All 
Prefectures; The conditional effects are calculated based on the specifications (4), (8) and (12) of Table 8; Regressions exclude communities with a population growth rate between 1951 and 1961 of less 
than -25% or more than 25%; All other covariates are held constant at their means; Dashed lines signify 90% confidence intervals; Rug plot at horizontal axis illustrates distribution of economically 
inactive women in All Prefectures; Red horizontal line marks marginal effect of 0. 
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Figure B6: Robustness tests for results in Figure 2 - controlling for other characteristics of the female population 
 
Notes: This graph shows the conditional effects of women’s suffrage on the change in electoral support for right, left and center-liberal parties at different values of economically inactive women in All 
Prefectures; The conditional effects are calculated based on the specifications (4), (8) and (12) of Table 8; Regressions include two additional control variables: the proportion of unmarried women and the 
proportion of illiterate women; All other covariates are held constant at their means; Dashed lines signify 90% confidence intervals; Rug plot at horizontal axis illustrates distribution of economically 
inactive women in All Prefectures; Red horizontal line marks marginal effect of 0. 
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Figure B7: Robustness tests for results in Figure 2 - interactive relationship with economically inactive gap 
 
Notes: This graph shows the conditional effects of women’s suffrage on the change in electoral support for right, left and center-liberal parties at different values of econ. inactive gap in All Prefectures; 
The conditional effects are calculated based on the specifications (4), (8) and (12) of Table 8; All other covariates are held constant at their means; Dashed lines signify 90% confidence intervals; Rug plot 
at horizontal axis illustrates distribution of economically inactive gap in All Prefectures; Red horizontal line marks marginal effect of 0.
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